


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1 JUNE 1992



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-92-018

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Japan To Host UN Disarmament Conference

OW1505212792 Beijing XINHUA in English
1655 GMT 15 May 92

[Text] United Nations, May 15 (XINHUA)—The United Nations will hold a conference on disarmament issues in the Asia-Pacific region in Hiroshima, Japan, from June 1 to 18.

The conference, according to a U.N. press release here today, will discuss "non-proliferation of mass-destruction weapons," "new dialogues and current trends in confidence-building in the region," and "prospects and challenges for arms limitation and cooperation for new security arrangements in the region."

In the field of non-proliferation, the participants will discuss the strengthening of the existing non-proliferation regime, the achievements and challenges for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the transfer of weapon technologies, and problems related to the elimination of mass-destruction weapons.

The conference will also review development of confidence-building measures in Northeast Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Indochina.

The conference will consider further measures for international and regional cooperation aimed at facilitating and enhancing a global response to today's emerging opportunities and challenges in the field of disarmament and security.

Some 60 participants mainly from Asia-Pacific governments, non-governmental organizations and research institutes have been invited to attend the conference which is being organized by the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs in cooperation with the Japanese Government.

Bush, Kazakh President Discuss START Treaty

OW1905231792 Beijing XINHUA in English
2238 GMT 19 May 92

[Text] Washington, May 19 (XINHUA)—President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan pledged here today that his country would sign a protocol to implement the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) as well as the non-proliferation treaty.

Nazarbayev made the pledges during his meetings with U.S. President George Bush and other U.S. officials.

After a two and half hour meeting with Nazarbayev, Bush said that "we welcome President Nazarbayev's commitment that Kazakhstan will join the non-proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, and that it will adhere to the START treaty."

"We'll continue to work toward a signing of the new START protocol by Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Byelarus, Russia and the United States in the very near future," Bush said.

The START treaty was signed last year between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the dissolution of the Soviet Union has complicated the ratification and the United States has been pressing the four former Soviet republics with strategic nuclear weapons to sign a protocol which will oblige [word as received] them to the START treaty.

During a visit here earlier this year, President Leonid Kravchuk agreed to the languages of the protocol on which the United States has been consulting with the four successor states of the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons since January.

After the Buzin-Nazarbayev meeting, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles told reporters that arrangements in the protocol agreed by Kazakhstan and Ukraine "are also acceptable to Russia and Byelarus, but this has to be confirmed."

Niles said that issues with Russia and Byelarus are "procedural" rather than substantive and that the United States and four former republics will probably sign the protocol when their foreign ministers meet in Lisbon later this week to attend an international conference on assistance to the former Soviet Union.

However, he cautioned that "sometimes procedural issues can take a bit of time, so I wouldn't want to put any point of end [passage as received] to when we'll be able to say that all four of the successors have indeed agreed to the same text and we're prepared to sign it."

Niles said that a letter signed by Nazarbayev was delivered to President Bush this morning, saying that Kazakhstan agrees to the conditions for the signing of the START protocol and the removal of all nuclear weapons from its territory within seven years.

The U.S. official also said that Bush agreed that the United States would help Kazakhstan establish a system for exports controls to prevent weapon proliferation and leakage of high technologies and would provide training assistances for an independent Kazakh army.

After their meeting, Bush and Nazarbayev signed three agreements on trade and investment, which would provide each other most-favored nation trade status and protections especially for U.S. investment in Kazakhstan.

Bush also accepted Nazarbayev's invitation to visit Kazakhstan, but the dates are undecided, Niles said.

Nazarbayev, who arrived here yesterday afternoon, would meet officials of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank tomorrow before heading to New York on his five-day visit of the United States.

ISREAL

Commentary Sees Need for Disarmament Policy

TA2005114592 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
20 May 92 p B1

[Commentary by Re'uven Pedatzur: "Preserving Supremacy"]

[Text] As expected, Israel's representatives at the Washington multilateral discussions last week managed to prevent a practical discussion of disarmament in the region. It was clear to the participants beforehand that the first session of the committee would be academic rather than practical in nature. The agreement on the nature of the meeting allowed the head of the Israeli delegation, David Ivri, to say that "Israel will not discuss disarmament issues at all before confidence-building measures between it and the Arab countries have been implemented."

Nevertheless, once the process of multilateral discussions starts, Israel may lose control of the pace and direction of the talks, forcing it very soon to face the need for a clear, comprehensive disarmament policy. David Ivri may well warn his interlocutors against "prematurely raising difficult questions," but it is not clear that Israel will be able to set the timetable and prevent "difficult questions" from being raised in the future as well.

While Ivri was using vague terms such as "difficult questions," the Arabs were making haste to disperse the vagueness, making it clear that all the parties are, in fact, speaking about the same issue. They explicitly demanded that the issue of Israel's nuclear potential be placed on the committee's agenda.

At the current stage of the discussions, the American hosts are also rebuffing Arab attempts to discuss the future of Israel's nuclear capability because they understand full well that if the Arabs insist on discussing it now, Israel may quit the talks.

But the Americans realize that it will not be long before Israel's nuclear potential will have to be addressed seriously. The first U.S. hint in this direction can be found in President Bush's Middle East disarmament initiative in May 1991.

Although Bush did not elaborate on the stages for settling the nuclear issue, an examination of his statement indicates that he is convinced this is one of the most important components in the very complicated matter of Middle East disarmament.

Until recently, Israel has maintained a policy of deliberate vagueness, which has scored great success. The familiar formula—that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region—provided a comfortable cover for everyone. The leaders of the countries bordering Israel believed that it possessed

nuclear weapons, but it was their clear interest to minimize public discussion of the issue.

They realized that they could live alongside a rational Israel even if it possessed nuclear capability. They accepted their nuclear asymmetry with Israel and played according to the rules set by Jerusalem.

But then the Gulf war reshuffled the cards. Israel lost control over the Middle East nuclear game. Once it was learned that Iraq was about to make the crossover into the nuclear era—something of which Israel's intelligence was totally unaware—it became apparent that the old rules of the game were no longer valid.

The discoveries of the UN teams in Iraq put an end to the era of uncertainty regarding the nuclear issue. It was made clear to Israel that it can no longer be certain that its potential nuclear supremacy can be sustained.

The fact that Iran and Algeria joined the game, which gained momentum after the Gulf war, of attempting to obtain nuclear capability has extended Israel's nuclear terms of reference. Nuclear arms in relatively remote countries such as those two and Libya constitute a direct threat to Israel.

Such developments create a kind of strategic bear hug that currently involves not only Israel and its neighbors but also more peripheral countries that in the past played no part in determining Israel's policy. Any future arrangement should, therefore, include control and supervision of the nuclear plans of those peripheral countries as well.

Therefore, a change in Israel's policy is called for. The policy, which thus far has proved very successful, can continue to work only if it is certain that Israel is the only country with nuclear potential. Israel must therefore set out to change its nuclear policy and take the initiative in this sphere—while it is the frontrunner. As soon as another country in the region has a nuclear potential, the strategic framework will change completely and will be based on balance of terror. Israel must prevent this change through a policy that prevents other countries in the region from arming themselves with nuclear weapons. This goal is common to Israel and the United States, and Israel's policy must be based on this. Only bringing the U.S. Administration into a far-reaching plan to prevent the Middle East from becoming nuclear can yield results.

Israel must make it clear that any such plan should be based on the parties' agreement to freeze the current state of affairs. That is to say that the Arab countries must accept Israel's potential nuclear supremacy for a long time. During this period, political and military arrangements will be formalized and tested in practice. Once they prove appropriate and stabilize the region, Israel could begin a gradual process of voluntarily disarming itself of its nuclear assets.

Senior Egyptian officials have already made it clear, in off-the-record conversations and closed meetings, that they are willing to accept this principle and have suggested starting a plan to turn the Middle East into a nuclear-free zone, recognizing that Israel's implementation of the demilitarization principle could take a long time.

The change Israel is required to make in its nuclear policy is not at all simple. It calls for new patterns of

thinking. However, since Defense Minister Arens has himself determined that "there is doubt whether any supervision can stop the Middle East nuclear arms race," the issue can no longer be overlooked while adhering to a policy that can prove irrelevant in the near future. We may continue publicly warning against "prematurely raising difficult questions" in the multilateral discussions, but it is our duty to hold extensive discussions among ourselves and prepare for the future.

GENERAL

Risks, Problems With Dismantling Discussed

PM0705161092 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 14, Apr 92 p 31

[Article by Gennadiy Novikov, head of the Safety-Improvement Laboratory at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy: "Put Down Zero, Carry What?"]

[Text] A world free of nuclear weapons, and any weapons ideally, belongs to the enticing ideas of humankind's radiant future which prove to be no more real than a pipe dream.

In fact, the world will always have at least non-military weapons and implements which can be turned into tools of aggression: like high explosives routinely used to fragment rock, or guns fired to disperse hail-bringing clouds, or commercial lasers.

Soviet and later Russia's leaders announced several cuts in the country's nuclear arsenal. However, to reduce it may prove almost as costly as to increase.

According to the press, the USSR had 30,000 nuclear charges. Recently I came across a figure of 35,000. Mikhail Gorbachev suggested to reduce this arsenal to the level of 5,000 warheads. Boris Yeltsin went even further and announced reduction of the offensive weapons to the level of 2,000-2,500 nuclear charges. Let's see how feasible this is.

First of all, let's look into the matter of the country's industrial capacity for dismantling nuclear weapons. No official data about it has been published, yet it isn't impossible to make your own calculations. If the nuclear inventory lists 30,000 items with a service life of 10-15 years each, then 2,000-3,000 nuclear charges have to be decommissioned and dismantled each year. The same number of charges is to be produced for a replacement. The industry can handle this task.

It would take us at least six years to disassemble 30,000 nuclear charges at a rate of 5,000 pieces a year. And we are going to face new problems here too: for example, if 2,500 nuclear charges are to be disassembled annually and the same number of new ones are to be produced, this will mean that only some of the components and materials are to be scrapped, and some others (primarily the fissionable materials like uranium and plutonium) are to be recycled and reused in new charges.

If the number of the disassembled charges doubles and the number of the newly produced ones dwindles almost to naught, the quantity of components to be destroyed doubles as well. This means that the fissionable materials will become unwanted for reuse. This, in turn, creates the problem of reusing the materials, including the biologically dangerous radioactive plutonium. The task of destruction and recirculation will require a whole new industry.

Transportation of 5,000 pieces of nuclear weapons from bases to industrial plants annually poses another problem. It will require 100 trains (each carrying about 50 nuclear charges) a year. Each train will travel 3-5 days. This means that for several years there will be a number of nuclear-carrying trains travelling daily along this country's railways. This possibility is rather disconcerting, considering the rate of railway accidents.

Hurried withdrawal of nukes from bases around the CIS to Russia also involves certain risk. Russia's traditional "powder kegs" will become overcrowded with nukes, increasing potential threat to the environment, particularly considering that Russia's bases are in dire need of reconstruction.

But any ill-considered political decisions can be avoided if we embark on cooperation with foreign (primarily U.S.) experts, for which we are already prepared. Russia can follow the U.S. suit and announce stepping up safety of the preserved nukes as well as ones under elimination as a national priority. Then the carrying out of this task of national importance will be promoted by corresponding state, legal, financial, organizational and technological support, including development and adoption of the single safety criteria for all the CIS countries. All technologies and procedures involved will be coordinated and improved to meet the safety criteria. This primarily concerns storage and transportation of nuclear charges, reclamation of fissionable materials, production of new types of nuclear weapons, and modernization of old ones. It will also pertain to national and international systems for spotting and reacting to breakdowns.

Conversion of the military industry into peaceful production is a current and widely discussed topic. Reduction of nuclear arsenals and increasing their safety is going to become one of the main directions of that conversion for the next 10-15 years. Perhaps it would be wise to engage Russia's nuclear experts with the problem rather than to find new jobs for them.

Public Destruction of Arms Seen as 'Daft'

PM1205153392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 May 92 Morning Edition p 8

[Report by Sergey Leskov: "The Show Featuring A Nuclear Bomb Can Only Be Seen Here"]

[Text] At its latest session the Legasov Foundation put forward an initiative suggesting the public destruction of a nuclear warhead and dismantling of nuclear bombs in Russia. According to the organizers of the coming attraction, it would be a way of acquiring some of the currency required for the destruction of hundreds of nuclear warheads, which the Russian treasury is having difficulty finding by other means at the moment.

The international Legasov Foundation was set up some months ago to promote ideas geared to safe ways of developing civilization. But it is an exaggeration to call the foundation international, since its only members are

investors from the CIS. The foundation does not have a big name either. Hopes of fame rest with the political clout of the foundation's leaders—A. Bessmertnykh, former USSR foreign minister, and A. Protsenko, former deputy minister of the union Ministry of Medium Machine Building. The planned action, for which there is not even the remotest precedent, has by no means an insignificant part to play....

According to information obtained by IZVESTIYA, the show proposal is currently under discussion at a number of Russian Supreme Soviet commissions and at the General Staff. The main question, which military department specialists were brought in to tackle, is that of maintaining secrecy during a public demonstration. It will not be difficult for an experienced observer to be able to determine the tactical and technical specifications of our nuclear weapons from the geometry of the missiles and even of the warheads. On the other hand, if you bring dismantled pieces of nuclear weapons to the show the event will cease to have any value.

But those behind the nuclear spectacle hope to resolve all the problems. The final scenario has not yet been confirmed, but the plan is that it should be held at the beginning of August in a big city, preferably Moscow. R. Gudimov, one of those behind the show, said that the destruction process would involve dividing the nuclear warhead into small parts using special equipment. The radioactive elements emit alpha particles, so spectators will have to be protected from dangerous radiation. If the military give their permission, the warhead will be brought to the inspection area, together with the missile. Otherwise a model will have to do. It is possible that a special amphitheater will need to be built in an open space for a large number of spectators. The stadiums that are presently available will scarcely do for the planned spectacle, since the military hardware will render the turf unfit for use.

What actual benefit could the spectacle bring? The agreement on the reduction of nuclear armaments presupposes the destruction of warheads, which will create an unprecedented quantity of radioactive materials—around 100 tonnes of plutonium and 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium. The processing and burial of these materials will require the use of high-technology methods, the solution of the safety problem, and vast expenditure to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars. If you recall that we were given no more than \$10 million even for orbital excursions by foreign cosmonauts, then one can assume that the planned event is not going to cause the Russian treasury to overflow. In the opinion of Academician N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, it is far more realistic to fall in with the U.S. decision to provide Russia with \$400 million for the destruction of nuclear warheads. For our part, we have only to estimate the cost of the technical measures. But things are not moving along as smoothly as they may be when organizing a concert.

What do the specialists think about the coming attraction? The physicists from Arzamas-16, who know their handiwork better than anyone else, doubt whether it will be possible to observe secrecy during the public destruction. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy described the show featuring the most awesome weapon as "daft." Another Kurchatov Nuclear Research Institute leader did not even believe my question: "What nonsense."

No, it is true. People are going to Europe to talk with foreigners. Well, foreigners will be interested to attend a nuclear circus....

Kazakh Foreign Minister on Prospects for Arms Control

*LD1105191192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1110 GMT 11 May 92*

[Report by KAZTAG correspondent Leyla Tulebayeva]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 11 May (TASS)—Kazakhstan Foreign Minister Tuleutay Suleymenov today met with an international delegation for control of arms exports, headed by Brian Donnelly (Great Britain) [name as received].

In the course of the conversation, the prospects for global and complete liquidation of nuclear weapons were discussed, as well as the ecological aspects of the problem of their testing. The importance of internationalizing states' activities in reducing and destroying nuclear armaments was underlined.

Tuleutay Suleymenov pointed out that Kazakhstan had undertaken to rigorously observe the provisions of the Alma-Ata Declaration and of the agreement on joint measures regarding nuclear weapons of 21 December 1991. The republic's leaders are considering the possibility of signing the Nuclear Arms Non-Proliferation Treaty; the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in space, and underwater; the convention banning military or other hostile use of agents against the natural environment; and other international documents.

Baku Hosts Conference on Weapons Control

*LD1305110692 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 12 May 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] A meeting of an international group of experts on controlling nuclear, bacteriological, chemical, and biological weapons was held in Baku today.

[Correspondent M. Mamedov] Specialists from countries of the Big Seven and Australia and representatives of the Azerbaijani Republic took part in the meeting. The main objective of the talks is to draw the attention of all the CIS republics to the need to sign international

conventions which help in controlling all types of weapons of mass destruction.

The Azerbaijani side expressed its readiness to cooperate in this important question with all international organizations. At the same time, the experts' attention was drawn to the fact that armed Armenian formations are using chemical weapons in the mountainous area of Karabakh. Cyanide, a highly effective poisonous substance which has been banned from use throughout the world, has been discovered in shells fired on populated Azerbaijani areas. The foreign specialists were shown the results of research carried out by Baku scientists and other material evidence.

More on Krasnoyarsk Decision To Close Reactors

LD1705125692 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0738 GMT 17 May 92

[Correspondent Yuriy Sysoyev report from Krasnoyarsk Kray]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Finally, by a decision of the Russian Government two uniflow nuclear reactors, which already have caused much harm and have polluted the area for hundreds of kilometers, will be shut down. The first reactor will be shut down on 1 June and the second on 1 September. [passage omitted]

There is information now that the nuclear warheads that have been withdrawn from the territory of the former Union republics will be returned to and destroyed at the plants that manufactured them, including at the complex near Krasnoyarsk.

We asked (Roman Sontsev), state secretary for the administration of Krasnoyarsk Kray, for an explanation. He expressed great alarm and confirmed our fears about the idea. In its time, the nuclear shield was forged for our whole country; Siberians would not like to be held hostage. It is one thing for nuclear bombs to be destroyed in the Arctic part of Krasnoyarsk Kray—you know that such explosions are to be carried out at Novaya Zemlya—and quite another for them to be destroyed near a city with a population of 1 million.

The state secretary for the administration of Krasnoyarsk Kray believes that the appropriate departments should give precise information about the true picture. Unfortunately, it can be a very bitter experience; it is only after many years that information on dozens of underground explosions carried out on the territory of the kray is coming to light, but that will not be tolerated any longer. [passage omitted]

Intention To Cut Military Spending Reiterated

Armed Forces Spokesman Comments

PM1805101592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 May 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Untitled ITAR-TASS report]

[Text] The Russian leadership's course of reducing the military budget remains unchanged. Lieutenant Manilov, chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Information Directorate, told an ITAR-TASS correspondent in an interview 15 May.

Defense spending in 1992, 1993, and subsequent years will decrease steadily in connection with the purposeful reduction in the Russian Armed Forces. This year defense spending will be at least 12 percent down on 1991 in comparable prices.

Some spending on the defense industry and conversion is envisaged. Thus, the general said, appropriations will be earmarked for implementing programs for the conversion of defense industry enterprises. However, the bulk of these appropriations will come from the internal resources of the defense industry itself. So this spending is not part of defense spending. V. Manilov stressed.

Strategic Rocket Forces Considered

PM1805102392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 May 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Nikolay Burbyga: "Rocket Forces Remain Under CIS Auspices"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov, chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Information Directorate, has held a briefing at which he denied a report that Russia will have its own strategic rocket forces.

"The point is," he stated, "that, in creating its own Armed Forces, the Russian Federation in accordance with presidential decrees took into its own jurisdiction and included in the Russian Federation Armed Forces all troops and naval forces (except the Black Sea Fleet, pending a solution of the question of its status via talks with Ukraine), including the Strategic Rocket Forces, stationed on its territory, and also combined units, units, and institutions located on other states' territories and not forming part of their national armed forces."

However, he stressed, this certainly does not mean that the Agreement on Strategic Forces signed by the CIS heads of state in Minsk 30 December 1991 will be violated. The troops included in the Strategic Forces under the agreement in question merely receive Russian affiliation but will continue to form part of the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces and will be subordinate to the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the commander of the Strategic Forces. They will fulfill tasks in the interests of the entire Commonwealth.

What will the Russian Armed Forces be like, and is there any military concept in this regard? Answering this question, Valeriy Manilov said that the main task is to preserve as far as possible what is left of the once united armed forces, not to lose the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of their main elements, and to try

to make up for losses with the insignificant funds allocated by the state for defense at such a difficult time.

As for the concept of the Russian Armed Forces, several drafts exist. It will be possible to say anything specific only when the concept has been legislatively ratified.

"How will the reduction in the strength of the troops taken into Russian jurisdiction be carried out?"

All measures are being taken to make this process as painless and smooth as possible, the general replied, and to provide social guarantees for the discharged officers, warrant officers, and members of their families.

It is planned to carry out the reduction of 700,000 men in the Armed Forces announced by the Russian president gradually over 1992-1994. And then over the next few years to reduce the Armed Forces by a further 600,000 men, thereby arriving at the planned strength of the Russian Armed Forces—1.5 million—by the year 2000.

This gradual reduction in strength is conditioned primarily by the impossibility of discharging over 300,000 officers and 100,000 warrant officers from the Armed Forces over the course of 2.5 years. The maximum number of people who can be discharged per year without violating their social rights is 70,000-80,000. Thus the ensuring of social guarantees for the discharged servicemen is what has determined the timetable for the reduction of the Armed Forces.

Social guarantees during discharge should be understood to mean, above all, the possibility of acquiring the right to a pension (if one or two years remained to be served) and provision with housing or the opportunity to construct or purchase housing, with the Defense Ministry repaying up to 50 percent of the loan. For officers and warrant officers discharged early and not having the right to a pension, they mean the opportunity for vocational retraining and for acquiring a civilian trade.

There are also other factors making it impossible to carry out blanket reductions over two or three years. One reason is that over this time we would not be able to destroy the tanks, missiles, ships, submarines, and other types of arms subject to reduction under international treaties.

Future of Nuclear Weapons Establishments Pondered

Mikhaylov at International Conference

924P0140A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 92
Morning Edition p 6

[Article by Sergey Mushkaterov: "Problems of Our Closed Cities Discussed in Norway"]

[Text] Russia is no longer producing highly enriched plutonium for military purposes, and it is destroying more nuclear weapons than it is producing. According to the

Associated Press this was communicated by Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhaylov, who spoke at the opening of a conference in the Norwegian city of Stavanger devoted to the problems of closed cities in the former Soviet Union.

Around 700,000 persons are currently living in Arzamas-16, Penza-19, Tomsk-7, Sverdlovsk-16 and other closed cities that cannot be found on ordinary maps of the former USSR. But they will hardly remain closed forever. Mikhaylov expressed the hope at the conference that some of them may be opened in as little as 5 years.

How is this to be done, how are these cities to be switched to peaceful rails? These questions are being discussed at the three-day conference in Stavanger by 30 scientists and representatives from 10 closed cities, Russian officials, and experts from Scandinavia, the USA, Great Britain and other countries. By the way, according to Mikhaylov many of his colleagues participating in the forum were abroad for the first time in their lives, while just a few years ago this was simply impossible to imagine. This fact alone attests to the uniqueness of the conference.

Judging from reports from news agencies, statements made by our participants to the forum are attracting most of the attention for the moment. In particular, the Associated Press cites Mikhaylov saying that Russia plans to close two military reactors this year, and another two over the next few years. He also assured Western participants that components and technology for nuclear weapon production will not be leaked abroad out of Russia. In turn, the mayor of Arzamas-16 said that there is no "brain drain" out of the closed cities either.

Much was also said about the assistance that the West could provide to scientists in closed cities. In Mikhaylov's opinion Western firms could sign contracts for particular jobs with the scientists so that they could continue working without leaving the country. He emphasized in this case: "We don't need charity. We have qualified specialists who want to work, if the West is interested in this."

Arzamas-16 Scientists Comment

924P0140B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 92
Morning Edition p 8

[Article: "Arzamas-16 Shows Its Face"]

[Text] It is not easy to get into this city even today, but even after granting permission for the visit, our hosts limited our stay to 2 days.

A few words on the city's history. After the Americans successfully tested their atomic bomb, Stalin took all steps to accelerate efforts to create Russian nuclear weapons. A site in the southeast of Gorkiy Oblast, where suitable housing was already available, was chosen as the place to organize the center for the bomb's development

and production. The nuclear scientists occupied buildings in Sarovskaya Desert. There was a technical base of sorts—a plant producing projectiles for Katyusha rocket launchers. And there were no special problems with manpower—the famous “Mordvinian camps” were a few kilometers away. In August 1949 the first test was conducted on the “article,” as they referred to it, and the city that had grown up by this time became the center of a race of many years for possession of increasingly more sophisticated nuclear weapons.

The situation that has now evolved evokes different reactions from the scientists. Twice-awarded Hero of Socialist Labor, four-time State Prize laureate, Lenin Prize laureate, chief designer for 30 years, and the person who developed the nuclear filling for all types of inter-continental as well as tactical rockets, Samvel Grigoryevich Kocharyants is categorically opposed to a return to the past, feeling that work could go on successfully even in the present situation.

Lieutenant General of Aviation Yevgeniy Arkadyevich Negin, an academician who bears the Gold Star of the Hero of Socialist Labor, has the diametrically opposite point of view:

“We are being asked to work under the conditions of market relations. This is impossible. It is my firm conviction that only budget financing in its full volume can save our sector. There are no alternatives to nuclear weapons, and we cannot play around with the country's defense capabilities. After all, the reductions the United States has agreed to have no influence on its defense capabilities.”

Yevgeniy Arkadyevich does not believe that the danger that our nuclear scientists might leave the country exists, feeling that they are sufficiently patriotic to share the country's difficulties, but the fact that the most talented young scientists are leaving for small enterprises and other commercial organizations troubles him greatly.

By the way, many unique things have been created here within the framework of conversion. Mark Prelas, the leader of the delegation of American nuclear scientists who visited the secret cities of Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, wrote in the newspaper CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR that “...Russian scientists possess world-class ‘know-how’ that can be used for peaceful purposes, but they need assistance from Western entrepreneurs. Their scientists have attained astounding results in materials science, nuclear technology and laser physics.”

And in fact, the developments that we were shown—from the world's tiniest X-ray machine to a polyclinic on wheels—are capable of amazing the most discriminating specialist.

START TALKS

Kozyrev, Baker Discuss START via Phone

OW0805115192 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1052 GMT 8 May 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to an official report from the Russian Foreign Ministry, in the afternoon May 7, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had a telephone conversation.

They discussed questions pertaining to measures facilitating the ratification of the START treaty by the CIS's four nuclear states (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Byelarus). The two sides came to the conclusion that these questions must remain in the field of their vision.

Andrey Kozyrev and James Baker also spoke about preparations for Boris Yeltsin's visit to the U.S. (June 16 to 18). Exchanging views on the situation in Afghanistan, the two officials said they favoured early stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan.

Complications in START Ratification Viewed

MK1505094092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 May 92 p 1

[Yuriy Leonov article under “Disarmament” rubric: “How Will START Treaty Be Ratified, and By Whom? Fate of Most Important Agreement Remains in Question”]

[Text] The START Treaty signed in July 1991 by the presidents of the USSR and the United States became one of the most important international documents. It gave hope of a sharp turnabout in bilateral relations away from confrontation toward cooperation and interaction, and it seemed that the treaty would be ratified soon after its signing. Far from it, alas. The August putsch and the USSR's rapid transformation into the CIS en route to the even greater exclusivity of the former Union republics at first delayed the treaty ratification process and then created so many additional problems that serious grounds have emerged for concern about its fate.

Russia, as the successor to the USSR, and recognized as such by the world community, and the United States at first advocated the preservation of the treaty's bilateral nature, implying that Moscow had the right to deal with the nuclear weapons situated on the territory of Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan. However, these three “nuclear states,” hoping to differing degrees that nuclear status would give them greater weight in the eyes of the world community, declared their intent to ratify the START Treaty as participating sides, which in accordance with international law would signify acknowledgment of their nuclear status. Wishing to accelerate ratification and begin sooner the process of shedding the

deadly burden, Russia did not object to the intention of its CIS neighbors if, simultaneously with the ratification of the START Treaty, they joined the 1968 Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty as states not possessing nuclear weapons. This would preserve for Russia the status of the sole nuclear successor of the USSR.

If Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan had stated outright their reluctance to join the 1968 treaty in a "non-nuclear" capacity, their hopes of arranging ties with the civilized world would immediately have had to be given up for lost: The members of the "nuclear club," in which the place of the USSR had been firmly occupied by Russia, would not tolerate the swelling of its ranks. Therefore, without disputing the essence of the matter, the "nuclear troika" began trying to secure for themselves by haggling a "gap" between the ratification of the START Treaty and their joining the Nonproliferation Treaty which allowed them to acquire the status—unprecedented in international practice—of "temporarily nuclear" states.

The pragmatic Americans "broke." Powerless to put an end to the uncertainty in the CIS subjects' mutual relations as regards the fulfillment and even the ratification of the START Treaty, at the beginning of May they sent to the capitals of the four possessors of strategic offensive weapons in the CIS another draft of the Protocol to the START Treaty drawn up by the American side following consultations with representatives of Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. This five-sided document regulates on the whole the relations among the four former Soviet republics as regards the START Treaty. Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan appear in it as parties to the treaty on a par with Russia and may join the Nonproliferation Treaty as nonnuclear states not simultaneously with the START Treaty's ratification but "as soon as possible" following the ratification, which—given the subjective desire of Kiev, for example—could mean some indeterminate interval of time during which Ukraine would retain the nuclear status it so desires but which is so dangerous for others.

The five-sided nature of the Americans' proposed Protocol is causing perplexity among many Russian politicians (Article VI states that "each side ratifies the Treaty along with the current Protocol in accordance with its constitutional procedures"). In the opinion of Yevgeniy Kozhokin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet's International Affairs Subcommittee, what is needed is not a five-sided but a four-sided protocol elaborated by Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan autonomously, as states which are the legal successors of the USSR.

In addition, in Kozhokin's opinion the Protocol provides room for maneuver in determining the levels and timeframes of the reductions.

"Russia is prepared to ratify the bilateral treaty," Kozhokin says. "As far as the five-sided document is concerned, its signing would create a completely new

strategic situation. The first hearings on the ratification of the START Treaty were held at a closed session of the Supreme Soviet in April. Now we have been forced to disrupt the timetable of the hearings. The START Treaty's transformation into a five-sided affair and the emergence of new nuclear states in line with the American draft—even if they do have 'temporary' status—will require us to do some serious thinking and, possibly, consult with the members of the 'nuclear club' aside from the United States. We need time to discuss the issue in parliament in the context of the new realities, we need a meeting—more than one, probably—of the five states to discuss and sign the Protocol, we need... In short, the impression is being created that the most complex stage of the disarmament negotiations was not concluded last July with the signing of the START Treaty but is to begin now by threatening complications and instability within the CIS. Clearly, Russia needs to ratify the treaty with maximum speed, but also with maximum caution. And the necessity for such caution is not refuted by the flattering opinion of the American draft Protocol expressed in Washington by Ukrainian President Kravchuk. It confirms the need, alas."

Yevgeniy Kozhokin will try to have the Protocol discussed in the Supreme Soviet in May. And in June the problems of the START Treaty will be an important theme in the first full-scale Russian-American summit, which will be held in Washington.

Ukraine Takes Control of 'Long-Range Aviation'

*LD1505150292 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1400 GMT 15 May 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] It was announced in Kiev today that formations and units of long-range aviation stationed on the territory of Ukraine are to be transferred to Ukrainian subordination. Those units which have nuclear weapons will remain under the operational subordination of the Joint Command of the CIS Armed Forces only until the total elimination and disbandment of those units.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Future Limits on Offensive, Defensive Arms Viewed

*924P0135A Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 12, 20-26 Mar 92 pp 10-11*

[Article by B.A. Basistov, candidate of technical sciences, under the rubric "Ideas and Opinions": "Destroy Weapons on Earth, But Do Not Put Them in Outer Space"]

[Text] We are continuing a discussion which was started by a letter from Academician N.N. Moiseyev.

Discussion of the article by Academician N. Moiseyev "Do Not Miss a Unique Opportunity" (see ZA RUBEZHOM No 34, 1991) has assumed a special urgency in connection with the fact that the question raised in it is now being actively discussed at the very highest international level.

Last year, in an address to the nation, U.S. President G. Bush called on the leadership of the USSR immediately to undertake specific measures jointly with the United States to establish the possibility of limited deployment of non-nuclear defense systems for the purpose of protection against limited nuclear strikes no matter where this threat came from. M.S. Gorbachev expressed a readiness to consider the American proposals. B.N. Yeltsin's statement "On Russia's Policy in the Sphere of Arms Limitations and Reductions" confirms this readiness.

N.N. Moiseyev's article, and certain others that have appeared in the press, examine variants for the creation of a global ABM [antiballistic missile] system with the participation of the USSR or Russia. However, as far as is known, the American Administration has not yet put forth even one specific proposal on involving our side in work on the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program.

An Important Factor in Strategic Stability

Speaking at the end of last year before a Soviet military delegation, G. Cooper, SDI program director, declared: The United States expects that a new spirit of cooperation will make it possible to modify the 1972 Treaty on Limitation of ABM Systems and on mutual agreement to deploy a limited antimissile system with space-based elements. In this connection, it is important to emphasize the special urgency of the affirmation contained in the aforementioned statement by B.N. Yeltsin of Russia's adherence, as the legal successor to the USSR, to this treaty, "which is an important factor in maintaining strategic stability in the world."

The United States has already prepared itself for the phased deployment of a global ABM system during the next five years. With the help of it, it expects to have an active influence on the policy of other countries, dictating its conditions from a position of strength. The SDI program budget for the current fiscal year exceeds the appropriations for the 1991 fiscal year by more than one-third.

Even a cursory examination of the system of global defense against limited strikes that has been developed by the United States makes it possible to conclude that it is intended not only for defense against accidental missile launches or attacks on the part of terrorists of the Saddam Husayn type. The system can successfully neutralize the threat of a limited strike on American territory, for example, from the direction of China: 700-1,000 land-based interceptor missiles and 1,000 space-based interceptors (the initial phase of the development of a global ABM system) against two to three dozen Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and

eight single-warhead ICBM's on a submarine. It is appropriate to mention here that China's policy by no means always pleases the United States—thus, in particular, China did not support the United States in the UN Security Council over the decision on employing military force against Iraq.

Nevertheless, there is a common interest on the part of the United States and other developed countries to set up a mechanism that ensures a higher level of general security, first and foremost a reduction in the threat of an outbreak of nuclear conflict. But it is necessary to reduce this threat first of all by way of a reduction in nuclear arsenals. In the opinion of prestigious U.S. military experts who prepared a report in 1991 on future nuclear strategy, in view of the elimination of the "socialist states in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the USSR, the United States can easily reduce the number of its nuclear warheads to 4-6,000. At the same time Harold Brown, a former secretary of defense, asserted that not more than 1,000 warheads are needed under certain conditions to ensure reliable deterrence. The military-political leadership both of the USSR and the United States came to an understanding on the inadmissibility of employing nuclear weapons on large scales. The reason for this was an analysis of the results of research on the global ecological consequences of numerous nuclear explosions, including an analysis conducted under the leadership of Academician Moiseyev in the mid-1980's of a mathematical modeling of these processes, and also an analysis of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. Thus, the proposed level of 2,500 nuclear warheads should become only an interim "stage" in the process of a mutual reduction of strategic offensive arms.

The most reliable path for radical reductions in offensive nuclear forces to a level at which other countries will also be able to be included in the process of reductions (and, consequently, also in the ABM negotiations) is that which ensures a lowering of the capability of either side to deliver a disarming strike. For a start, it could be possible to come to an agreement with the United States on the removal from armaments of multiple reentry vehicles of ballistic missiles, which served as the main reason for expanding work on ABM systems with an outer space intercept echelon. If each side deploys even a small number (limited by treaty) of single warhead sections with nuclear charges on some of their carriers in an arbitrary way (equipping the rest of the missiles, for example, with nonnuclear warhead sections), then, given parity in nuclear warheads, a disarming strike becomes impossible. In this case, the possibility must be examined of simultaneously monitoring all ICBM's for the purpose of treaty compliance, after which the monitoring side has the right to change the order of deploying nuclear and nonnuclear nose sections at its discretion.

As for the possibility of cooperation with the United States in work on the research and creation of defensive systems, it should be noted first: Such cooperation in itself will make it possible to lower the probability of a

military conflict between our countries, particularly owing to the "neutralization" of such a destabilizing factor as the disorganization of the defense branches of the industry of the former USSR, and, consequently, a significant part of the economy of the CIS as well. In addition, it will eliminate the reasons for raising the threat estimate too high, and will increase the degree of mutual trust.

At the same time, a revision or rejection of the ABM Treaty and the implementation of Pentagon plans to deploy an outer space antimissile defense will create obstacles to further significant reductions in offensive arms, and could provoke a new spiral in the arms race, which would entail an escalation of the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. It is about this specifically that such eminent American specialists as, in particular, H. Bethe, R. Garwin, S. Kinney, and G. York are writing, who think that the "deployment by the United States of outer space systems of defense against ballistic weapons will damage rather than increase the security of the United States" (ZA RUBEZHOM No. 3, 1992). As the results of research by a number of institutes of the defense branches of industry of the former USSR have shown, the establishment of an effective ABM system (including with an outer space intercept echelon) against planned strikes by several dozens of modern, highly technical missiles that are equipped with means of overcoming ABM is practically unrealizable even on the basis of the combined powerful economic capabilities of the United States and its NATO allies. First of all, it is unrealizable because of the rather low "coefficient of employment" of space-based weapons, especially given planned strikes from submarines. This means that, in the intercept of any strike (including a massive one), it would be possible to employ only a small part (less than 10 percent) of the weapons deployed in outer space. And also, this weapon could be neutralized to a significant degree by the attacking side.

In this connection, the lament of Colonel A.I. Radionov to the effect that "we have been thrown back 10 years in a technological sense," and that even the essence of the "asymmetric variant" (ZA RUBEZHOM No. 7, 1992) is "still not clear" to him, seems rather strange. In the meantime, the new "Brilliant Pebbles" technology emerged specifically by virtue of the fact that the previous variant of the building of an outer space U.S. ABM echelon did not produce the desired effect, given rather simple asymmetric counteractive measures on the part of the USSR. We also were developing a "symmetric variant" in our country. Moreover, it was shown that our country's own variant of a projectile of the "Brilliant Pebbles" type, in the event of a need to develop it, will not be that different from the American in mass and characteristic velocity. An ABM system, unique in its complexity, some of whose components are superior in a number of basic characteristics to similar means being developed and tested in the United States, has been deployed near Moscow.

This system can also resolve the task of defense against a ballistic missile strike by "third countries" in which only a small group of single warhead missiles can participate at the same time. The Americans, who have far more optical sensors in space than we do, are awaiting the results of our experiments with the ionic gun for the "repair" of outer surfaces of lenses which over time lose quality during operations in low orbits. However, to have the chance in the future for advantageous cooperation, it is vitally important to raise this technological level, or we really will end up being thrown back.

The developers of the SDI program at the present time are reorienting it to the creation of a global ABM system against limited ballistic missile strikes. Other tasks of strategic defense, including an increase in the efficiency of retaliatory actions during a disarming strike, have been moved into the background. However, given deeper reductions in strategic offensive arms, the United States might be tempted to create a rather developed ABM system that will be able, if not to play the role of a shield with respect to the nuclear missile potential of any other country, including Russia, at least preserve the potential for retaliation in a missile attack on the United States, which makes such an attack senseless if the attacking side does not possess a similar system. But in the event of a disarming strike on the part of the United States, this system can repel a retaliatory strike by surviving ballistic missiles of the other side against American cities (which increases the temptation to employ force in a crisis situation). Therefore, one of the most important tasks in designing prospective strategic systems is to determine the correlation between the levels of defensive and offensive arms that do not upset the balance of forces.

Possible Steps Toward Cooperation

It is exactly in this sphere that it is necessary first and foremost to reach a mutual understanding with the American researchers and developers, and to the extent possible also to come to an agreement about identical approaches to the resolution of problems that arise. It would be ideal to use one and the same model, or at least mutually calibrated models, to obtain corresponding estimates. This should be the first step in cooperation with the United States, which, incidentally, does not require the transfer of technology from them, against which restrictions exist to this day.

The next step in this cooperation should be the unification of efforts in resolving the task of global monitoring of near-earth space and the atmosphere by national means, first and foremost by ballistic missile launch detection systems and means of information support of land-based ABM complexes. At the same time, the detection of accidental ICBM launches and ballistic missile launches of "third countries" will be conducted practically through reduplicated information. In the initial stage—according to the combined data existing in our country and in the United States of national detection systems based on geostationary satellites that are

equipped with optical systems in the near infrared range. The results here would be more reliable, which is very important in the detection of launches of single ballistic missiles. In the event of a ballistic missile launch by "third countries" close to our borders, this combined information under favorable observation conditions can be confirmed and refined by radar and optical systems deployed on the periphery of our country.

Integrating information in the interests of achieving the necessary operational efficiency and warning should be accomplished by each side in its own command-computer center. For example, in the United States, in the NORAD [North American Air Defense Command] center, and in our country, in the Missile-Space Defense (RKO) Command Post. At the same time, the exchange of information should be conducted through special communications channels that ensure maximum operational efficiency. The emergency situation warning center ("hot line") can serve as a prototype for such coordinated action.

In the future (with the establishment of low orbit global information systems), it will be feasible to intensify coordinated action for the purpose of increasing the operational efficiency of issuing information on ballistic missile launches, by comparison with that which was provided by American space systems during the war in the Persian Gulf. There must be a guarantee of automatic delivery of information from any satellite (if necessary, through a relay) to the NORAD center and the RKO Command Post.

Further steps in this direction will depend on the international situation, which changes so quickly that any forecasts are quite conditional. Obviously, in the course of examining basic ways of strengthening stability in the world and individual regions, problems also must be resolved that arise in connection with the future improvement of strategic weapons systems, including defensive systems, and also their monitoring. The elaboration and conclusion of new military-political agreements in these spheres is a laborious and prolonged process.

If in the course of negotiations on these questions a revision of the Treaty on Limiting ABM Systems that is undesirable for us (in both a political and military-technical sense) really becomes inevitable, it is necessary in the process of achieving new agreements to strive for a preservation of the ban against placing weapons in outer space, or (in the worst variant) to strictly regulate the number and parameters of orbits of outer space combat equipment. Any country that signs the new wording of the treaty, which should become open to the entry of other countries, should grant the opportunity for monitoring its compliance and the employment of sanctions in the event of its violation. Up to and including the destruction of weapons launched into outer space that exceed the established number.

In conclusion, it remains to express regret that in the preparation of new agreements in the sphere of strategic defense no claim has been made on the results of the activity of working groups of experts from the defense branches of industry, which were created at one time for an analysis of the status of work on SDI and for an evaluation of the capabilities of our country's science and technology in the plan for maintaining a strategic balance of forces. Assigning such experts (while they are still in our country) to the elaboration of sound proposals on the limitation of ABM systems would make it possible to avoid damage to our national interests resulting from adopting poorly reasoned decisions.

Russian SDI Involvement Examined

*PM1105161092 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 15, Apr 92 pp 26-28*

[Article by Vladimir Moskvina: "A Space Umbrella for the Military-Industrial Complex"]

[Text] Russians are probably fated to worship what they had once cursed. At a recent meeting of the UN Security Council President Yeltsin suddenly declared about the need "to make anti-missile defence systems simpler and cheaper and abolish anti-satellite systems." He pointed to the urgent need of building "a global system of defence for the world community." For this purpose the Strategic Defence Initiative of the United States could be redesigned by using high technologies developed in the defence complex of Russia.

A Surprising Turn

Thus, after an outright rejection of SDI Moscow accepted the American programme and even expressed its desire for cooperation. This turn of events came as a surprise to the West and especially to Russia. The new initiative is said to have stunned specialists in the Russian Foreign Ministry and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States. They are wondering how it is possible to observe the ABM treaty, the adherence to which Moscow confirms at the highest level, and simultaneously build "a global defence system." For the treaty prohibits the creation of large-scale anti-missile systems and, what is important, their deployment in outer space (article V). Specialists do not know how to find a strategy that would preserve the ABM treaty while creating the semblance of following the "global defence" concept advanced by scientists close to the Russian higher-ups, and prevent Russia from being recklessly drawn into a new round of the arms race.

Few people understood the real essence of the matter and waited for explanations from the Russian leadership. However, explanations merely confused the matter. Marshal Shaposhnikov spoke about a system based on "the space means developed by Americans and the ground means of anti-missile defence developed by Russia." According to Academician Velikhov, only "an

early warning system" is proposed, not space-based anti-missile systems. If one is to believe journalists, President Yeltsin confirmed that he had in mind a joint tracking and warning of a missile threat, and nothing more.

It remains to be seen whether it is a cunning diplomatic move to impel the American partners to adopt positions more acceptable to Russia or to have a "collusion" between the two administrations. The latter fear that the general public, which supports the ABM treaty, can disrupt their plans of creating a new variant of the SDI in the common interests of the military-industrial complexes of Russia and the United States.

It became known from authoritative sources that Russia's desire to take part in the working out of a new SDI was included in the text of the President's statement at the very last moment, a surprise for the original speech-writers. This was apparently done so that the Russian advocates of the ABM treaty could not set out their counterarguments. Some believe that the change was made under the influence of academicians Moiseyev and Velikhov and Semenov, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and general designer of the research and production association *energiya*. Semenov is evidently going to build a new early warning system on the basis of designs from the cold-war period. It is believed that the idea was supported also by officials of the military-industrial complex whose voice is heard ever more loudly in the circles close to the Russian President.

"An Ideal Solution"

While the Russian leadership proclaimed disarmament plans many key officials from the former defence department at the CPSU's central committee and the defence and state security department, in President Gorbachev's office, were invited to work in the Russian administration and are again able to control, almost fully, the country's defence policy. Even with the present-day economic and social crisis in the country powerful forces within the Russian military-industrial complex are making every effort to keep their potential and looking for a pretext to once again launch the arms drive.

Yeltsin's initiative seems to be "an ideal solution" for the military-industrial complex. The designing of components for "global defence," and a multi-billion expenditure, can be justified by the noble aims of further promoting relations with the United States and "the strengthening of world peace." It can even be hinted that Russia has the chance of receiving dollars from the American partner in payment for the design work done by Russian scientists. Another argument is also used, namely, the urgent need for building—under the UN aegis and on a worldwide scale—an effective system of collective defence against the threat of a nuclear missile strike.

A considerable base for such cooperation was laid down in Russia in the course of preparing "asymmetric" and

"symmetric" replies to the SDI in the past. By making references to the existing backlogs, the defence industry officials evidently managed to get the support of the Russian leadership. It is possible, however, that concern for big cheeses in the military-industrial complex can also be explained by the desire of our leadership to tame the representatives of the most powerful and not yet broken structure of the administrative command-style system of government.

Not without the assistance of academicians connected with the defence industry, the generals of the military-industrial complex impelled the Russian President to announce that, together with Americans, our scientists and designers are prepared to develop a "global defence system." After that the United States and Russia will have "to produce and launch it" by joint efforts (possibly with the participation of other nuclear states), and jointly "exploit" it.

"Brilliant pebbles" on the Road to Security

What is "a global system" like? Last autumn, at bilateral talks in Geneva on anti-missile defence and space issues, the American delegation proposed jointly working out a system of "global protection against limited strikes" and opening talks on "a new ABM regime" which would replace the ABM treaty and allow both sides to carry out "a limited deployment of ABM systems for protection against limited ballistic missile strikes."

The Americans are planning to include three components in the future system.

First, mobile tactical anti-missiles, in particular the modernized anti-aircraft missile complex Patriot and the ACEC, ERINT and THAAD systems.

Second, a "limited" ABM system on US territory (750 land-based GBI and E21 interceptors) capable of annihilating around 200 strategic missiles fired by accident or in an unauthorized launching. In the opinion of US experts, it is the most probable variant, because about 200 missiles can be fired by the commander of a strategic Typhoon submarine if he were to lose control, or from one deployment base of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Third, space-based systems to protect the theatre of war and the continental part of the United States, "brilliant pebbles" anti-missiles (the interception of ballistic missiles with a flying range of over 600 km), multi-functional space-based "brilliant eyes" sensors, ground control centres and command points. The Americans were not and are not going to give up the deployment of anti-missiles in space. In their opinion, without such components a future "limited" system would be "extremely costly and ineffective."

True, Washington pledged, together with Moscow, to set limits on such deployment with the aim of guaranteeing the effectiveness of strategic deterrence forces on both sides. It was supposed that, regardless of Moscow's reply,

the United States would continue to implement the SDI programme in its new form, though till a certain time Washington promises to observe the ABM treaty.

Such an approach was well reasoned. It can be asked, however, whether the Americans really need Russia's consent to withdraw from the ABM treaty or can they just do it themselves, especially in view of the present situation in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Neutralization of Imaginary Threats

One can argue, of course, whether the ABM treaty is outdated or not, or whether the former Soviet leaders adhered to it, due to their awareness that the Soviet Union was lagging behind the United States in the field of advanced space technologies. In the opinion of many Russian and American specialists, the new version of the SDI was devised for neutralizing imaginary threats.

Russia does not need such "protection" at all. The missile threat from Third World nations, should it appear, can safely be averted by missiles of the Soviet tactical anti-aircraft defence. Strategic ballistic carriers of weapons of mass destruction can hardly be produced in the Third World, even if a dozen of these nations join the missile or, God forbid, the nuclear club. Incidentally, membership of the nuclear club is not a serious argument either, for the manufacture of ballistic missiles takes 10 to 15 years and involves the expenditure of colossal resources which none of these countries have.

Such a missile programme is difficult to conceal, and the civilized world is able either to compel a state anxious to acquire a nuclear status to stop building up its military potential or to take drastic countermeasures, the effectiveness of which was demonstrated by operation Desert Storm. Countermeasures of this kind will cost much cheaper than any global defence system with the use of new technologies. It will be recalled that, by the irony of fate, this threat was created by the Soviet Union, which supplied its friends and allies in the Arab world with Scud B missiles which became well known after the war in the Persian Gulf.

The danger of an accidental or unauthorized launching of American strategic missiles is practically ruled out, because the United States has perfect blocking procedures. Besides, this danger can be effectively combatted by improving the available organizational and technical means of averting undesirable launchings, for instance, by fitting all missiles with built-in mechanisms of self-destruction for an emergency situation.

The main thing is that any anti-missile defence system is ineffective in the purely military respect. It does not guarantee a country from "non-missile" threats, for a nuclear explosive device can easily be smuggled by terrorists in a suitcase or launched in a pilotless airplane. There are also special means for penetrating through anti-missile defences, say, the use of dummy warheads or warheads which, like a cruise missile, begin to glide as they approach the targets.

It is also impossible to ignore the negative reactions of other countries, say France or Argentina, and the world community as a whole, to the withdrawing from the ABM treaty. It can be supposed that such a move will cause legitimate discontent in neighbouring countries.

President Yeltsin's statement on Russia's readiness to take part in a new SDI has given a strong argument to those forces in the United States which have long sought to get through the Congress broad programmes for the arms race in space and are interested in violating the provisions of the ABM treaty.

The position should be defined clearly

Most likely, the Russian President was again misled by his advisers and experts. In the past few days Yeltsin's proposals have been increasingly interpreted not as a call for the deployment of an anti-missile system but as an idea of establishing "global control" over near-terrestrial space exercised jointly by way of an exchange of information between the United States and Russia and possibly other countries.

Of course, systems for the interception of strategic missiles, that is, "active" defence like "brilliant pebbles," and systems for an early warning of missile attacks are different things. The building of early warning systems is in no way limited, and it can only be welcomed. If only such systems are intended, the Russian authorities should have clearly stated that they are not going to give the green light to the placing of weapons in space. Without our analogues—"pebbles," the Russian military-industrial complex will have enough orders for devising only means of control and warning.

Besides, analyzing the intricacies of military space problems and the prospects of ensuring strategic stability in the world, where Russian and the United States today act as military and political allies, one should not forget about expenditure. It is doubtful that the deployment of a new SDI will not have an adverse effect on the Russian budget. According to most conservative estimates, the American system will cost the taxpayers from 40 to 150 billion dollars. It is not clear either what kind of technology the United States is prepared to share with Russia, even now when it seems indecent to talk about confrontation.

Should Moscow agree to spend colossal sums and violate the ABM treaty, to make steps not necessitated by any substantial change in the strategic situation?

Defense Capability 'Dropped' in Former USSR

*LD1305162492 Moscow (TAR-TASS in English)
1108 GMT 13 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—"The USSR's defence capacity had declined substantially during the last years of the Union's existence," former member of the CPSU

Central Committee [CC] and Chairman of the Military Policy Commission of the Party CC Oleg Baklanov claims.

Baklanov was responsible for national defence until the August events in Moscow. Now he is in custody on charges of complicity in the abortive coup d'etat. His statement on the former Soviet leadership's defence policy is published in the latest issue of the newspaper "DEN".

As an example of how the former USSR's defence capacity had dropped, Baklanov refers to the Soviet nuclear attack early warning system. "The Krasnoyarsk station, built for that purpose and all but commissioned, was regarded by the United States as a violation of the ABM treaty," Baklanov says. "However, two early warning American and NATO stations remain in operation despite the fact that they contradict the reached agreements. Hence, we now have a hole in our defence system on the north-eastern flank, while the United States continues to use stations that were set up in violation of the treaty," he stresses.

Speaking about the strategic initiative programme, Baklanov notes that it "was announced by American politicians and strategists as a national system, intended to prevent a possible attack on the United States". "The present reduction of our nuclear missile potential provides additional chances for this system, now developed in the United States, to counter our nuclear missile shield," he adds. Baklanov believes the Soviet-American disarmament talks were "conducted not on an equal basis", but to the detriment of the former Union's security.

"These actions cannot be explained from the point of view of safeguarding Russian statehood and normal development of our society," Baklanov states.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Further on Lithuanian Efforts To Press Russian Withdrawal

Differences Noted

PM1005161592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 May 92 p 1

[Captain Second Rank V. Vladimirov report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Lithuania-Russia: 'Sides' Positions Harden' on Troop Withdrawal Questions]

[Text] Vilnius, 5 May—Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev, the Russian Federation president's special representative and Russian first deputy foreign minister, and Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, exchanged instruments of ratification of the treaty "On the Principles of Interstate Relations

Between the Lithuanian Republic and the Russian Federation" in Vilnius 4 May. Following this the treaty signed last July in Moscow, comes into force.

In meetings with the Lithuanian leadership the Russian first deputy foreign minister also discussed questions of the Russian troop withdrawal from Lithuanian territory and our partners' property claims against Russia. Put in official language, differences of opinion on the troop withdrawal problem emerged during the talks. The Russian side proposed the second half of the nineties as a deadline for the withdrawal, while Lithuania is insisting on the completion of this process before 1992.

Answering journalists' questions, Shelov-Kovedyayev remarked that Russia is prepared, as far as possible, to bring forward the troop withdrawal deadline. But as regards property problems, Shelov-Kovedyayev noted that, in his opinion, questions of the former USSR's property on Lithuanian territory must be discussed as a whole. For its part, Lithuania is insisting on a separate discussion with Russia of questions relating to compensation for damage caused to Lithuania "by the presence of Soviet troops."

According to information in the editorial office's possession, during the current meeting no specific sum was mentioned which Lithuania intends to demand. "We are ready to receive the Lithuanian delegation in Moscow 15-16 May should the need arise to speed up the talks on this problem," Shelov-Kovedyayev told journalists.

Within the framework of the visit to Lithuania by the Russian Federation president's special representative, a meeting was held between Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, and Territorial Protection Minister Audrius Butkevicius. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has learned that the Lithuanian side expressed its readiness in principle to construct housing for the servicemen withdrawn from the republic, but provided that the West supplies the funds for this. However, Mironov reported to journalists that at the same time the Lithuanian side has demanded that Russia submit a list of names of officers and warrant officers who must be provided with apartments. For its part, the Russian side is demanding that Lithuania's specific housing construction potential be defined first.

In Mironov's words, "the sides' positions have hardened" at the current stage. Answering a RIA correspondent's question, Col. Gen. Mironov noted that further work on this question by expert groups lies ahead.

The Russian delegation was in Riga 5 May.

'No Progress' in Talks

LD0905174892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0805 GMT 9 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Kazys Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius May 9 TASS—No progress has been made in the talks on the withdrawal of former Soviet troops

from Lithuania. Aleksandras Abishala, head of the Lithuanian expert group at the talks, said.

"No progress has been reached in the question of the withdrawal of former Soviet Army from Lithuania. Perhaps, even a step back was made," Abishala said, commenting on the results of talks with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyayev who recently visited Lithuania.

The sides agreed, however, to meet in Moscow on May 25 to discuss the withdrawal and other issues.

Mitterrand Supports Soviet Withdrawal

*OW1405141092 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1331 GMT 14 May 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On behalf of their countries French President Francois Mitterrand and the head of the Lithuanian Parliament Vytautas Landsbergis have signed, in Vilnius, a treaty of cooperation.

Addressing the Lithuanian Parliament before the signing ceremony, President Mitterrand focused on the withdrawal of the formerly Soviet troops from Lithuania. He pointed out Lithuania was entitled to demand an early withdrawal. But he stressed the time element of the withdrawal must be thought out in detail. He said he saw the problems of the withdrawal but was confident a friendly solution would be found.

The French President also pointed out the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council shared the French approach and would back the Lithuanian position at any international forum.

Reports on Troop Withdrawal From Poland

Air Regiment Leaves for Smolensk

*PM0705115492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 6 May 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast: Video report by X, identified by caption]

[Text] A fighter aviation regiment, part of the Northern Group of Forces stationed near Chojna, Szczecin Province, has left Polish territory. All of its 32 aircraft have left for its permanent base in Smolensk. The regiment has been stationed here since 1945. It has left behind various facilities, including houses, barracks, hangars, and repair depots.

6,000 Soldiers To Remain After 15 Nov

*PM1505153192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 May 92 p 3*

[ITAR-TASS report: "They Will Be Withdrawn Before 15 November 1992"]

[Text] During a meeting with Andrzej Glapinski, voivoda of Legnica Voivodship, held Friday to mark the 47th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite fascism, Colonel General V. Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces, confirmed yet again that "all CIS combat units will be withdrawn from the territory of Poland before 15 November this year." The headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces is in Legnica. This is stated in a report by Antoni Golab, the voivoda's plenipotentiary for matters of cooperation with foreign countries, published in today's issue of GAZETA WYBORCZA.

Following their withdrawal, approximately 6,000 Russian soldiers will still remain in the Republic of Poland, including 1,300-1,500 in Legnica Voivodship. This group will ensure the transit across Polish territory of units of former Soviet troops being withdrawn from the former GDR, the general pointed out.

According to the newspaper's data received in the bureau of the Polish Government's plenipotentiary for matters of the presence and withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces from the Republic of Poland, 27 railroad transport trains left Poland during April of this year alone, with servicemen, members of their families, combat hardware, and gear. Still more are planned in May—30 trains. If the withdrawal continues at this pace, the commentary points out, "there is no doubt that the Russians will keep their word."

Future of Troops Withdrawn From Germany Pondered

Parliamentarians Meet WGF Officers

*PM0805151392 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 May 92 First Edition p 7*

[Russian Supreme Soviet Press Center report: "Meeting of Russian Parliamentarians With Western Group of Forces [WGF] Command"]

[Text] The delegation of Russian parliamentarians visiting the Western Group of Forces (WGF) began work 5 May with a meeting with members of the group's military council and command. Deployed in eastern Germany, the WGF comes under Russian Federation jurisdiction and is financed out of its state budget, which predetermined the interested deputies' natural attention to solving the problems of Russian servicemen abroad.

Opening the meeting, S.A. Filatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, highlighted the three tasks which the deputies' group will have to resolve

during their tour of the WGF: studying problems relating to the troop withdrawal from Germany—which should be completed by 1994; discussing the principle foundations of the concept of the Russian Federation's military policy; and briefing the personnel on the current legislative activity of parliament and on the sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation in the country.

The first deputy head of parliament announced the signing of a presidential decree, due 7 May, envisaging the creation of a Russian Army and Russian Defense Ministry.

"This was not our choice," S. Filatov stressed. "Russia was interested in preserving the CIS Joint Armed Forces and did not strive to split them up into national armies."

The WGF commander is particularly concerned about the gap between the pace of troop withdrawal and the construction of housing for the servicemen being withdrawn. In 1991 alone, more than 15,000 officer and warrant officer families returned to the CIS states without apartments waiting for them, and another 20,000 are expected in 1992.

Troop Withdrawal Discussed

LD0805161192 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1842 GMT 7 May 92

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Aleksandr Semyonov]

[Text] Bonn May 7 TASS—Chairman of the German Parliament Defence Commission Fritz Wittmann met Chairman of the Russian Parliament Defence and Security Committee Sergey Stepashin and Chairman of the Russian Parliament Committee on Social Protection of Servicemen and Members of their Families Aleksandr Korovnikov today to discuss a wide range of issues connected with the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces' units to Russian territory.

The meeting focused on building housing for the withdrawn servicemen and social programs carried out by the German side, Stepashin told *ITAR-TASS*.

The matter is that plans of troops withdrawal have changed, and the major part of the troops are now withdrawn to Russian territory. The German side expressed understanding of the problems Russia has in this connection and showed its readiness to contribute to the fulfillment of the established programs.

The meeting was also attended by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov.

Disbanding 8th Guards Army 'Mistake'

PM1105115492 Moscow *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 8 May 92 First Edition p 7

[Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Press Center report: "Deputies Criticize CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command"]

[Text] The working visit by a group of Russian Federation people's deputies, headed by S.A. Filatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, to units of the Western Group of Forces stationed in East Germany is continuing.

During meetings with personnel and servicemen's families, attention was not only focused on social problems, which are, as always, acute, but also questions of the future of those formations with the highest level of combat capability—which could form the backbone of the Russian army.

The 8th Guards Army must live on. The decision to disband [*rasformirovaniye*] one of the most combat-capable units of the Russian Army is a political mistake by the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command. The history and combat career of the 8th Guards Army, which won fame on battlefields from Stalingrad to Berlin, is part of our national historical consciousness, which must not be destroyed. The members of one group of deputies are convinced of that.

"The question of the fate of such formations as the 8th Guards Army and the 9th Tank Division must be decided at the highest political level, by presidential decree or Supreme Soviet resolution," in the view of A.V. Korovnikov, chairman of a parliamentary committee. "Our deputies' group intends to propose to the president that he review the decision of the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command."

News Conference After Visiting Troops

LD1205015492 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1545 GMT 11 May 92

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondents Aleksey Korinenko]

[Excerpts] Wunsdorf, 11 May—After visiting the Western Group of Forces [WGF] we have fewer questions for the WGF command, but on the other hand, more questions for the Russian Government. This was how Sergey Filatov, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, summed up the results of the stay of his Russian parliamentary delegation with the WGF. He was speaking today at a news conference for German and foreign journalists. On our return to Moscow, we will not only put these questions to representatives of the government, but we will also try jointly to settle them, he noted.

The first deputy chairman of the Russian parliament shared the impressions gained by members of the delegation during the week-long stay at the WGF garrisons. This group of troops, he noted, is the largest and most powerful. It is precisely this group which will chiefly make up the backbone of the Russian Armed Forces. One of its main tasks, at present, is to prepare and conduct an organized withdrawal from German territory and to restation units. During meetings with servicemen and members of their families, we tried to answer numerous questions and to explain about the course of

forming the Russian Army, the conditions for receiving servicemen's families in their new postings, and about the course of housing construction. The problem of housing is perhaps more acute than others. It is my belief that a state program is needed to solve it. We will try to ensure such a program either at the government level or through the adoption of a decision by the Supreme Soviet.

Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the WGF, stressed that troop withdrawal measures are being carried out according to plan. To date, about 45,000 servicemen have left German territory and over 15,000 items of combat equipment and about 320,000 tonnes of material stores have been withdrawn. This pace has been ensured by the effective application of the experience gained during 1992, through the high degree of discipline—especially among officers of the group of troops, by the efficiency of various German services, and through the support and understanding on the part of the local authorities. He noted that, by the end of the current year, troops will, for the most part, be withdrawn from Saxony and Thuringia, along with such major cities as Leipzig and Dresden. [passage omitted]

Burlakov's proposal that a clinic for Chernobyl sufferers be set up in place of a military hospital in Belitsa was well received by Russian parliamentary members. Sergey Stepashin, chairman of the committee under the Supreme Soviet of Russia for questions of defense and security, spoke about the basic factors connected with the formation of the Russian Armed Forces. He noted that in the course of the next year or two, the size of the Russian army will be roughly halved and will come to approximately 1.5 million. We do not want to repeat the mistakes of the 1950's and 1960's, emphasized the member of parliament. For the most part, those discharged from the ranks of the armed forces will be those who have served the necessary term and have not expressed the desire to continue military service.

Later today the delegation of Russian parliamentary members departed for Russia.

Official: Pullout on Schedule

PM1505144992 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 May 92 First Edition p 1

[Report from ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA-ITAR-TASS news roundup: Troops Leaving On Schedule"]

[Text] The Western Group of Forces, which is to be withdrawn from Germany by the end of 1994, will form the backbone of the Russian Armed Forces. So said Sergey Filatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, who headed the parliamentary delegation that visited military units still stationed in the FRG.

The movement of troops from Germany to Russia is proceeding according to plan, Sergey Filatov said, but there has also been a number of problems. He named a

recent case, where police in Lithuania, on some far-fetched pretext, had tried to disarm the escort detail guarding a military train carrying equipment from Germany to Russia. The Supreme Soviet first deputy chairman said that parliament is planning trips by deputies to other states where troops under Russian jurisdiction are stationed, and also to parts of our country where the troops will go when they have been redeployed.

WGF Seen as Nucleus of Russian Army

PM1505154892 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 May 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Sergey Filatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, by correspondent Colonel S. Pashayev at end of Filatov's visit to Western Group of Forces, WGF; place and date not given: "Sergey Filatov: Units of the Western Group of Forces Could Become the Nucleus of Russia's Armed Forces"—first four paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction, last two are unattributed postscript]

[Text] The visit to the Western Group of Forces [WGF] by a prestigious Russian Federation Supreme Soviet delegation has ended. In the course of the week the parliamentarians thoroughly studied their life, living conditions, and combat training.

In the course of the concluding press conference, delegation head S. Filatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet; S. Stepashin, chairman of the parliamentary Committee for Questions of Defense and Security; A. Korovnikov, chairman of the parliamentary Committee for the Affairs of Invalids and War and Labor Veterans and The Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families; and Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander in chief of the WGF, summed up their joint work. It was stressed that the visit was fruitful and timely, that it was of a businesslike, constructive nature, and that it identified a whole range of problems that the lawmakers have to examine.

At the press conference, S. Filatov noted that as a result of the visit, considerably fewer questions remain to be put to the WGF and the group's command, but more to be put to the Russian Government.

Our WGF correspondent met with the head of the Russian parliamentary delegation.

[Pashayev] Sergey Aleksandrovich, the visit has finished and the process of getting acquainted, so to speak, with the WGF has taken place. A range of priority problems which the Russian parliament could try to help resolve in the near future has been defined. What are these problems?

[Filatov] In brief, they are questions of organizing the withdrawal, receiving the troops, stationing them on Russian territory, and preserving the officer cadres—highly professional, trained, and with much to offer.

Preserving units and formations that could become the backbone of the Russian army. Much has to be done to resolve the accumulated social questions. On this list of priorities there is the problem of selling the WGF's real estate, the fate of monuments and burial sites of our servicemen, and the development of contacts with our German partners.

[Pashayev] It is no secret that, while talking about the systematic withdrawal of the WGF, in practice we have thus far been carrying out its virtual disbandment [rasformirovaniye]. Truly elite units and formations, with the highest combat capability and combat readiness, the flower of the country's Armed Forces, have disappeared and are disappearing into oblivion. Can we hope that the Russian parliament will intervene in this situation? For instance, so that we could keep legendary formations like the former 62d Stalingrad, now the 8th Guards Combined-Arms Army, as the basis of the Russian army?

[Filatov] I would like to think so. Let me remind you, incidentally, that until recently, Russia's leadership was not concerned with the army. Like much else, it was not accessible to us. While the Union existed, it was made unequivocally clear to us that our sphere of concern was housing and municipal services. Everything else, including the defense complex and the Armed Forces, was the concern of the Union structures. Today, Russia is both forced and under a duty, to think about its own army. About preserving what will, after the necessary reforms, become its basis. About the stationing of troops, about appropriate special-purpose financing of the region. Of course, illusions must be abandoned. First, much time has been lost, and second, we are in a very grave economic situation. We will do what is possible, there is no doubt of that. The solicitous attitude and cautiousness of approach, combined with seriousness of intention, provide grounds for believing that the aim will be achieved with minimum losses.

As for the Western Group, even from the historical viewpoint it is a unique formation which should have a worthy place in the Russian army. You mentioned the legendary 62d Army, formed outside the walls of Stalingrad. Take the 1st Tank Army, which Katukov commanded, and the 2d Tank Army, born in the Urals—all these are part of our Fatherland's history, and cannot be neglected. In my opinion, combat traditions, priceless military relics, today's level of training of command cadres and all the WGF personnel, their high morale—everything argues against dispersing and scattering this potential, especially since the situation today means that our Moscow Military District is basically a border district. Clearly, as a result of the new status of Russia's Armed Forces, we will have to adjust the plans for stationing the troops. This in turn, puts a whole range of social problems onto the agenda.

[Pashayev] The most pressing of these is obviously the problem of housing for servicemen?

[Filatov] Yes of course, although there is a whole range, a whole package of problems connected with the redeployment of the troops and the provision of facilities for them. In the WGF, the officer corps consists mainly of Russians [rossiyane]. It is therefore necessary also to redistribute the construction of military camps for the military. Both the Supreme Soviet and the government, according to Gaydar's statement, will do everything to ensure that our Russian plan—56,000 apartments for officers—is fulfilled. We will find the funds for this. The problem today is this—how to erect the housing, with what forces, using what construction facilities. Not even cooperative construction, even if paid for in hard currency, will be able to handle this task, I believe. It simply will not have the capacities to deal with the requirements that exist today. Major organizational work is needed here, aimed, in particular, at setting up some kind of large-scale joint enterprise. I know that Germany and other countries have proposals on this score.

[Pashayev] But even today in Moscow and a number of other cities, according to the newspapers, there are a good many finished apartments, mainly cooperative-built, which have remained unsold for a long time because of their high cost. Why not start selling them for hard currency to WGF officers, who are doing without even the most essential things today in order to amass currency in the hope of obtaining a roof over their heads? It is well known that the WGF command is trying to go along with their wishes, and is prepared to allocate part of the resources earned by the group in order partially to compensate for this expenditure. Do you not think that the Russian legislators could initiate this process and remove the last remaining obstacles at the highest state level?

[Filatov] We will certainly meet with the leaders of Russia's major cities and discuss this problem together comprehensively. If finished housing is available, we will certainly ask, recommend, that it be handed over. In my view this is one solution—hand over what is not being bought today.

[Pashayev] One of the most pressing of the problems you mentioned at the beginning of our talk is the problem of selling the WGF's real estate, everything that was built in Germany out of our resources in the postwar years. The closer we get to 1994, the less optimism there is, it must be admitted. The kind of situation we encountered in withdrawing troops from other countries is already looming on the horizon. Is it not high time today to make use of the universal method of solving this problem—to raise at intergovernment level the question of a lump-sum payment?

[Filatov] That is certainly how the question should be handled, but on the other hand, note that we are still inclined to seek ways out of complex situations at, shall we say, a centralized level, at the level of heads of state and government. For some reason we always think this is the optimum solution. But we have joined the market

now. And there is now the entrepreneur, who is potentially no less strong than the government. I am convinced that if you furnish the entrepreneur with a normal, sensible legislative base, he can and must be brought in boldly to resolve the most complex problems. Often this turns out to be far more productive and advantageous. Therefore I think that apart from what is being done through government channels, through parliamentarians, and through the commander in chief, we must also make serious use of the channel I mentioned. Just look: There is the land, there is the property. The land belongs to the Germans, and only German citizens can lay claim to it. Russian citizens can lay claim to the property. So it is necessary to bring two entrepreneurs together and help them to form an entrepreneurial union which will begin to work and bring mutual benefit to both the German side and us. Here I think it is simply that things have not been fully thought through. In the near future, the presidium and government will apparently adopt a special resolution concerning the development of joint enterprises on the basis of the real estate of the WGF.

[Pashayev] In these difficult times, what do you wish KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers, most of whose lives are linked with the army?

[Filatov] Hope must be their support. We are currently going through a period when hope is simply essential. I think we have overcome the political crisis. There will, of course, be struggles, disputes, and difficult questions ahead, but we must abandon the barricade mentality, the raising of banners and rifles against one another. It is time to pool our efforts and move forward. Your newspaper, which I think is finding the right tone today, should promote that process.

By the Way

On his return to Moscow Sergey Filatov, speaking at a briefing in the White House, briefed journalists on the Russian parliament's work in connection with the redeployment of troops.

Speaking at the briefing, Boris Pastukhov, Russian deputy foreign minister, stressed that our servicemen are maintaining good, businesslike relations with the German authorities and doing everything to ensure that the German people are left with good memories of them.

Baltic States Seek Aid in Pressing Russian Pullout

Nordic Council Stance

LD0905101892 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 7 May 92

[Text] The presence of foreign troops on the territory of the Baltic States without a treaty is incompatible with the current European process. This unanimous opinion was voiced by the (?deputy) ministers of foreign affairs of the Nordic states who took part in a conference at [placename indistinct]. They also said that from the

point of view of the security of the Nordic countries, it was important that the treaties on the schedules for the troop withdrawals be set up without delay.

Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev, the special representative of the Russian president and Russian first deputy foreign minister, told journalists after his return to Moscow following visits to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia that the pressure being put on the process of negotiations over the troop withdrawals could threaten security not only in Russia but in Lithuania as well.

Giving his point of view on the referendum to be held in Lithuania on the withdrawal of the Armed Forces by the end of this year, Shelov-Kovedyayev pointed out that this was an issue in bilateral relations and could not be resolved by a referendum.

Foreign Ministers Appeal to NATO

LD1405110592 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 14 May 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have asked NATO to help accelerate the CIS troop withdrawal from their territory. The Baltic foreign ministers made this request during a meeting with the North Atlantic bloc's leadership in Brussels.

Latvian Government Bureau To Control CIS Withdrawal

LD1005054392 Riga Radio Riga International
in Latvian 0430 GMT 9 May 92

[Text] The government will control the withdrawal of the Russian Army. The Government of Latvia has decided to form a special bureau to control the course of withdrawal of the armed forces under the jurisdiction of Russia. The main task of the bureau will be to ensure supervision and control of the course of withdrawal of the armed forces, and the work of registering, valuation and taking over of the sites under their authority. There will be more than 10 workers in the bureau. All the ministries have been instructed to appoint responsible officials who, together with the representatives of self-governments, will form commissions for handing over and receiving the sites under the former USSR, now Russian, authority.

Moldovan President Demands Withdrawal of Russian 14th Army

Telegram to Yeltsin

LD1205101292 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0852 GMT 12 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Chisinau, 12 May—Moldovan President Mircea Snegur has demanded that Russian President Boris

Yeltsin immediately withdraw from the republic's territory units of the 14th Army which are stationed in the Dniester Region under Russian jurisdiction.

In a telegram sent to the Russian president today, Mircea Snegur has accused the command of the 14th Army of "open support for the separatists."

"Some officers of military units are acting as instructors in armed formations set up illegally on the left bank", the telegram states.

Skirmishes between the forces of the Moldovan police and the Dniester Region guard which are in confrontation here have been continuing over the last 24 hours around the town of Dubossary (Dniester Region). The sides have accused each other of violating the cease-fire agreement. There are no casualties, according to preliminary data which the press centers of the Internal Affairs Ministries of Moldova and Tiraspol have revealed.

At a meeting of the Conciliation Commission last Sunday [10 May] it was decided to set up a conflict group which would discuss the separation of the armed formations in the Dubossary area. The Conciliation Commission will continue work 14 May.

The Moldovan leadership will be able to preserve its authority in the immediate future and guarantee the republic's integrity. This is the opinion held by around 60 percent of those taking part in a poll conducted recently by the independent sociological service of Moldova. However, around 40 percent stated that the sociopolitical situation is now out of the control of the authorities.

Repeats Demand in Interview

LD1605151292 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1200 GMT 16 May 92

[Text] Moldova cannot give up this region, which is its indivisible part, said the republic's president, Mircea Snegur, in an interview with a NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA correspondent. He is referring to the left bank region. In the last 50 years the left bank area has been developing as part of a single complex. Thirty-seven percent of Moldova's industrial potential is located there, Snegur pointed out. Everything produced on the left bank has been produced thanks to investments that belonged to all the people of Moldova. Moldova and all that it possesses do not belong to politicians but to all the people. By no means can it, or will it, give away its territory.

The president asserts that the neutrality of the 14th CIS Army stationed in Moldova is nonexistent. According to him it is indirectly involved in the conflict by supplying weapons and materiel as well as by the participation of military experts in preparing charts, plans and briefings.

The Army should be withdrawn to Russia, Mircea Snegur declares. The position of Moldovan leadership on this issue remains unchanged, according to him: A

peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Dneister region along the lines defined in the declaration of the foreign ministers of the four countries, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine and Russia.

Germans Inspect Moscow Tank Regiment

LD1405093292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1806 GMT 13 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—Germany applied to the Russian Government on May 5 to allow inspection of the 77th tank regiment of the Moscow Military District, in accordance with the 1992 Vienna agreement, it was announced here on Wednesday [13 May].

The request of the German Government has been satisfied.

Officials from German Armed Forces arrived in Russia on May 12.

On Wednesday, they checked the information at their disposal.

Delegation 'Satisfied' With Estonian Talks

LD1305183192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1716 GMT 13 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Aleksandras Budris and Sergey Skripnikov]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—The Russian delegation is on the whole satisfied with the second round of Russian-Estonian negotiations, which ended in Moscow today after two days of work, Moscow's chief negotiator Vasily Svirin told ITAR-TASS.

The talks focused on a draft treaty on the stationing and withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia. The sides failed to agree on an acceptable schedule for the pull out, Svirin said.

The Russian delegation said troops would be withdrawn by the end of 1997. The Estonian side insisted that they should be pulled out by the end of the year.

Economic issues were also on the agenda, Svirin said. The sides discussed an agreement on mutual settlements in line with Estonia's intention to introduce its own currency. "The problem includes a range of difficult issues which will need repeated discussion," the diplomat said.

The talks also focused on border issues, including economic, transport, energy supply and other things. The sides have begun working on a corresponding protocol.

The next meeting will be held in the first week of June in Parnu, Estonia. The agenda of the meeting will be agreed through diplomatic channels, Svirin said.

Non-Affiliated Troops Under Russian Control

*LD1505125892 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0900 GMT 15 May 92*

[Excerpt] Troops situated on the territory of former Soviet republics which have not announced that they are establishing their own armed forces have been placed under Russian jurisdiction. This was declared by General Pavel Grachev in a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA interview. According to Grachev, the status of Russian troops in the Transcaucasus will be temporary. They will be withdrawn gradually over a period of approximately two years. [passage omitted]

Ukrainian Troops Withdrawn From Transcaucasus

*LD1605210592 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 16 May 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Ukrainian servicemen are being withdrawn by airplane from the Transcaucasus military district. According to a report by IMMA-PRESS, an understanding has been reached between the district command and Kiev regarding the evacuation of all Ukrainians performing service in the district.

NUCLEAR TESTING**Minister on Need for Testing, Scientists' Responsibility**

*PM1205133792 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7, 8 May 92]*

[Two-part article by Professor V. Mikhaylov, Russian Federation minister for atomic energy: "Nuclear Weapons"]

[7 May First Edition p 4]

[Excerpts] It is of course difficult to give a full account in a single article of all the complex and contradictory aspects of the military-political, socioeconomic, and scientific problems of nuclear weapons in our country in the world as it is today.

I have written an account of my thoughts about and approach to the field in which I have worked for over 30 years, including my presence for two or three months every year at nuclear tests, excluding the last three years when I was appointed deputy minister.

I am convinced of one thing: Despite the complex contradictions that exist in our society, nothing stops our desire to proceed along the road of progress. And on this road nuclear weapons will long continue to defend our right to freely choose this road which is worthy of our people. [passage omitted]

On 27 June 1954 the world's first nuclear electric power station, with a capacity of 5,000 kilowatts of electric power, came on line in the city of Obninsk near Moscow. Before this event the great discovery of our century—the energy within the nucleus of an atom—was associated in the minds of millions of people with military uses alone. Today nuclear electric power stations generate about 16 percent of the world's total electric power output. And this proportion is rising.

On the one hand nuclear power is the only electricity generator capable of supplying mankind with energy over a long period that does not contribute to the greenhouse effect and acid rain, while on the other hand nuclear power is by its very nature unsafe for man and his environment. The danger of global contamination of the environment by radioactivity could arise as the result of the destruction of nuclear reactors in any accident or conventional military conflict.

First Tests

[Passage omitted] During the difficult war and postwar years a new industry was established. What impelled the physicists, designers, and organizers to labor selflessly from early morning till late at night in order to set up the nuclear industry? Primarily, I think, it was on the one hand love for their motherland and genuine patriotism, and on the other the natural desire to display their intelligence and talent as men. It is precisely this combination of state and personal interests that forms, in my view, true common human values regardless of the age or the country. Today, unfortunately, these are often replaced by the pursuit of a "quick buck" at any price. [passage omitted]

Our tests at practically the same time as the U.S. ones were exceptionally significant in ensuring the national security of the Soviet Union and overall stability in the world. They completely destroyed the Americans' monopoly in the possession of nuclear weapons.

The development of atomic and hydrogen weapons marked a new stage in the history of mankind and brought to the fore a number of vitally important philosophical and world-view problems which society had not had to face before, thus raising the level of politicians' responsibility for the entire existence of life itself on our planet.

The fact that mankind had mastered the energy of nuclear reactions raised a number of multilayered and equivocal issues, but one extremely important result—mankind had crossed into a new historical era in terms of resolving military-political conflicts—this was indisputable. This is where the strength of perestroika lay, in that it noted and clearly delineated in a timely fashion the main points of this new era in human development.

Professional nuclear scientists were and are perfectly aware of the responsibility they bear to society and to

peoples for keeping the sky above our planet peaceful and for ruling out a repetition of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedies.

In 1953 the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building was formed to direct this new sector of science and technology, and in 1989 this was transformed into the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry. From the very outset this sector was established on the basis of a scientific and technical potential with a powerful production base, that is to say it represented a new type of scientific and technical complex.

Signal of Hope

The nuclear weapons development process is inseparably linked with nuclear tests in the natural environment.

Nuclear test explosions are carried out in order to develop and improve nuclear weapons for the purposes of verifying theoretical calculations relating to the basic design of a nuclear device. The precision designs of nuclear weapons also necessitate systematic checking of test specimens among weapons in storage.

From the very outset, however, nuclear testing of nuclear weapons had and continues to have a negative effect on many aspects of international life and the health and well-being of millions of people. Nuclear explosions, especially in the atmosphere and on the ground, whoever carries them out, have ultimately led to an increase in the total amount of radioactivity in our environment. The Soviet Union resolutely stood at the forefront of the forces that supported a ban on all kinds of nuclear weapons tests as a first step on the road to stopping the nuclear arms race and the road to a nuclear-free world. [passage omitted]

Further success in limiting nuclear tests depends entirely on the U.S. position on this issue, since provided there are no delays, all the preconditions exist to develop the success that has already been achieved, primarily as regards limiting the number of nuclear weapons tests that are conducted annually, including weapons with a TNT equivalent of up to 150 kilotonnes. The transition to a quantitative limitation of tests is a qualitatively new step which first and foremost requires a definition of the concept of the minimum TNT-equivalent threshold for a genuine nuclear explosion, bearing in mind the technical potential for verifying this, that is to say a definition of the term "nuclear explosion."

A mechanism for verifying the number of nuclear tests could be implemented on an extensive international basis—which is very important—by grouping national verification systems into international systems and by carrying out inspections at sites where explosions are carried out.

To this end I believe it is important that international agreement should be reached in the near future on criteria for safely carrying out underground nuclear

explosions and on verifying the implementation of these criteria on nuclear test sites and beyond.

Today the cessation of all nuclear tests is of key importance in preventing the development of third-generation nuclear weapons or so-called directed weapons, in stopping this evil jinn from progressing beyond the stage of scientific research to the stage of full-scale designs that will give a new twist to the nuclear arms race. These are weapons with qualitatively new parameters in terms of safety in peacetime and effectiveness and target strike reliability in wartime. On the one hand these weapons should be hundreds of times less dangerous than existing ones as regards overall radioactive contamination, and on the other they are able to hit strategic enemy targets both in space and on earth. It is precisely this aspect that is causing alarm, since some overly ardent hotheads could be tempted to use them in any local conflict. And it has not been ruled out that with the development of third-generation weapons there will be a move away from a policy of "deterrence" to one of "intimidation."

In this connection it is worrying that second-generation nuclear weapons could be destroyed on treaty principles under the strictest international verification while the West, it seems, will achieve success in developing third-generation weapons.

Today nuclear weapons are primarily a means of maintaining overall political, military, and economic stability on our planet, regardless of whether the countries that possess them are confronting one another in any sphere.

The only alternative to nuclear equilibrium and a deterrence strategy is a regime of complete trust, complete openness, and a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons and the design of nuclear weapons. This is our goal.

We need to proceed toward this goal along all possible roads: Official and people's diplomacy, including the "green" movement, cultural and scientific exchanges, development of trade and joint enterprises, and so forth. At the same time we must strive to achieve international agreements regarding a step-by-step maximum possible reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. It is important to highlight those aspects that inherently encourage the emergence of mistrust or aggressiveness.

Unfortunately, until such time as all measures to eliminate nuclear weapons and thwart opportunities for designing them in any country in the world yield a noticeable result, our Commonwealth is obliged to maintain its defense sufficiency.

Together Into the Future

Together with a number of countries in the world we have an opportunity to strengthen the collective security system in the near future, bearing in mind the unique historical situation.

At the present time, in conditions of new mutual understanding and full-scale steps in matters of cooperation, there is in fact a colossal military machine in the world that poses a direct material threat, not just a hypothetical one. The degree and nature of external military threats is changing as time goes by, but at every stage the Commonwealth's security status should match the realities of the world as it exists.

However, unchallenged speeches regarding the complete cessation of nuclear tests in our country made by public figures on radio, on television, in the press, and from the rostrums of Supreme Soviets, as well as rallies and meetings of various social organizations, are molding public opinion on the need for further unilateral steps.

There is no doubt that most authors have the sincerest intentions of saving mankind from nuclear disaster. However, in recent years the center of gravity in the struggle for universal nuclear disarmament has abruptly shifted in our country in the direction of actual unilateral nuclear disarmament. After all, nuclear weapons today, bearing in mind all the consequences of using them, are primarily a weapon of global politics. A chorus of social commentators is drowning out the voice of the professionals in an area where competence and carefulness are particularly important. The mass media are basically not letting specialist professionals have their say, and open slander, fabrications, and demagogic speeches often remain unanswered. Erroneous judgments masquerade as facts, and the effect of environmental factors unconnected with radiation is passed off as being due to the effect of radiation.

Incidentally, Soviet journalists did not attend the U.S. explosion in Nevada under the joint verification experiment, although they were officially invited to do so. A situation has been created in our country in which it is thought patriotic and progressive to express any criticism of Soviet nuclear weapons and test sites. And as always happens in cases such as these, a number of public figures are exploiting the situation to boost their own popularity, occasionally appearing in the role of stage managers of mass demonstrations.

We are all striving to put our own house in order, but not everything is going smoothly for us at the moment. There are many examples of this at every stage. Our house is not alone on the planet, we all live in a complex and dynamic world. In an age of nuclear and space technology, the space and time of this world have shrunk to the limit for each house.

There are still many areas of the world with an unstable political situation, extremism, and an aggressive atmosphere, including those directly on our borders. Certain "other countries" are working intensively to develop nuclear weapons. So a nuclear potential that was established when our country was going through hard times, and the maintenance of this potential at a modern scientific and technical level, is a guarantee of the stability of peace on our planet.

By cutting nuclear weapons we can retain immeasurably more resources for the needs of the national economy than we can by unilaterally banning nuclear tests—the foundations of the country's scientific, technical, and military potential—until such time as we achieve a universal ban on nuclear tests. It should be stressed that for all the importance of effecting unilateral disarmament measures, it is extremely important not to take the final step into the abyss, toward processes that are irreversible. It is far more difficult to prevent unique collectives of highly skilled professionals from slipping into decline than it is to destroy everything. Right now it is far simpler, given the extremely complex social and economic situation, to demand that our country take ever greater unilateral steps. Was it really any easier for us in the postwar years, when we were building up our nuclear industry? But today, frankly, a high level of civic courage is needed in order to retain, despite the situation that has developed with regard to our country's nuclear laboratories and test sites, a high degree of responsibility and patriotism, and not to yield to the temptation of short-term profit for the collectives of workers, engineers, and scientists when resolving issues to do with preserving nuclear potential at all stages of disarmament.

The transition to defense sufficiency is now closely linked with the reorientation of the entire Soviet military-industrial potential toward qualitative parameters in terms of weapons based on the achievements of modern science and technology.

Processes of bilateral disarmament, in which considerable successes were achieved during the perestroika years, are logical in realizing the blueprint for reasonable sufficiency for the country's defense. In this process the first steps on the road to nuclear disarmament are particularly significant—the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, i.e. the INF Treaty, and the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty which has been signed (the START Treaty).

At the end of September 1991 and January 1992 Washington announced large-scale cuts in U.S. nuclear forces. I am convinced that these steps taken by U.S. President G. Bush will be supported by our people and our leadership, since they are in keeping with the essence of the policy of perestroika. The reciprocal steps and counterproposals made by our country and Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin are a distillation of the efforts we made during the perestroika years on the road to a new world. All this is the result of the new political thinking and the nuclear age.

In this regard, when the two largest nuclear powers agree to reduce their nuclear arsenals, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons should become the main factor on the road to a nuclear-free world. Within the framework of the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the agreements reached in 1974 and 1984, and the 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, it would be advisable to formulate national measures for controlling relevant deliveries and

technologies in the reformed Commonwealth while keeping the Russian nuclear weapons complex intact as a national asset belonging to the people for the purpose of tackling these aspects of military-political problems as well. Russia should become the only nuclear power and the legal successor to the former Union. One nuclear power, like it was before, and not two or three—this fulfills the aspirations of those who are fighting for a nuclear-free world.

[8 May First Edition p 4]

[Text] In 1946 a national laboratory was created, the so-called Laboratory No. 2, for the development of nuclear weapons, and the talented engineer General P.M. Zernov was appointed its first director. Now that laboratory, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, is located on the border of Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and the Mordovian Republic, and is basically a city with a population of 100,000.

Our second national nuclear weapons development "laboratory" was created on the shores of Lake Sinara in Chelyabinsk Oblast in 1955, and its first director was the important engineer D.Ye. Vasilyev. The city and the institute—the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics—were created simultaneously.

In a relatively short space of time these institutes grew into major scientific centers.

These are basically major science and production centers where science, design, and production form a single, indissolubly linked cycle and where unique experimental, computer, and production facilities have been created. The activity of these institutes played a decisive part in ensuring the nuclear weapons equilibrium between the USSR and the United States, and in recent years also as regards test verification measures at bilateral talks. These institutes' potential makes it possible to tackle major scientific and technical problems attendant on nuclear disarmament processes in the context of the need to ensure defense sufficiency at each stage of disarmament.

The proportion of scientific research and developments at the institutes in spheres without a military application totals around 25 percent, and is showing a tendency to increase. Some of these developments are already being widely applied in the national economy.

Strict Regime

The country's best specialists were selected for work in these institutes. I will say frankly that life in these cities was difficult, because of the strict regime of access for friends and relatives. We all accepted this, because the work was important. The defense of the Motherland's borders was always regarded as one of our people's glorious traditions! But today these mighty heroes have difficulty buying rationed matches, salt, and all the other things that are essential to basic survival. One in five institute workers is in a waiting line for housing. The

average wage at these institutes in 1991 was around 450 rubles [R] a month, and for one worker in seven it was less than R250 a month, which is below the minimum living wage. The 90 percent increase in pay from January 1992 does not solve the problem of existence for them, in the context of free prices. If you take into account the particularly difficult working conditions, often involving a risk to life, and the difficulties of everyday life in closed cities, you can imagine these people's desperation, their heartfelt cries. In January of this year a meeting took place in the Kremlin between leading scientists and Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. We were waiting for such a meeting throughout the perestroika years. In this complex and difficult time for Russia B.N. Yeltsin gave us a whole working day. There was a thorough discussion of all aspects of the nuclear weapons complex. I was very pleased with this meeting and the concern shown for our workers.

The creation of nuclear weapons requires the participation of major scientists. A major scientist is not going to work in a closed city unless suitable conditions are created for his life and work. And young people today will not go and work in such conditions. For instance, today the average age of engineering and technical staffers at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics is 44, and the average age for the institute as a whole is 42.

It must be particularly noted that the prototype weapons that are developed and manufactured for dispatch to the nuclear testing range are naturally a source of danger. It is therefore extremely important to restrict access to closed cities for people not involved in this work.

In recent years the situation regarding developing, improving, and maintaining the combat capability of nuclear weapons has become considerably more difficult in our country. Finance and material and technical provision for the work of weapons institutes have deteriorated sharply, to such an extent as to call into question the possibility of further work on nuclear weapons in the country, including work to increase their safety. The development of experimental, testing, and production facilities has virtually stopped, virtually no funds are being allocated for replacing obsolete equipment, and housing construction has been cut back considerably.

Thus the national laboratories' real expenditure on research and development in 1991 was 40 percent down on the 1990 figure, both by virtue of the reduction in financing and by virtue of the increased cost of materials and subassemblies and the maintenance of the social sphere. Although 1992 has come, the question of finance for this year has yet to be resolved. The most highly qualified and energetic scientific staffers, designers, and workers have been forced to stop work in the weapons area and move to cooperatives or small enterprises, thereby losing their scientific and professional potential.

In this situation Russian President B.N. Yeltsin's visit to Arzamas-16 in late March was extremely important.

This was the first time in the entire history of this national nuclear center that the country's leader had visited our nuclear specialists. There was a thorough and businesslike discussion on preserving the sector's scientific and technical potential in the context of the conversion of military production.

Today the country's nuclear weapons complex, which includes nuclear fuel production plants, nuclear munitions manufacturing plants, and scientific research institutes, employs more than 100,000 people, and more than half a million people live in cities which are closed in terms of their security and secrecy conditions. This entire complex is located in Russia. The enterprises' fixed capital, built up over 45 years, totals something like R4 billion. Deterioration as of today is more than 50 percent. According to our estimates, the similar complex under the Department of Energy in the United States has fixed capital worth more than \$15 billion, with a work force of a fairly similar size. In the next 20-25 years the Americans intend to renew their nuclear missile complex, making provision for substantial financing (up to one-third of total expenditure) to safeguard the employees' health and protect the environment. One of the U.S. Administration's basic goals is the qualitative improvement and modernization of the nuclear weapons complex as the basis of military-strategic potential, in order to successfully fulfill the strategic defense initiative (SDI) program and create a new generation of nuclear weapons.

In these conditions, naturally, nuclear weapons should remain the basis of national security for our country and for the world in general. As of today I am convinced that the basis of world stability and of the nature of economic relations is mutual understanding between Russia and the United States.

Serious efforts are now being made by the world community aimed at halting militarization processes and eventually designed to demilitarize the world community, but the world we live in today is entirely a militarized world.

In 1990 we drew up an outline plan for the development and modernization of enterprises engaged in the development, testing, and production of nuclear munitions until the year 2010. The total expenditure of capital investments on this modernization program amounts to some R0.7 billion a year. In the conditions of a real reduction in nuclear arms, this outline plan devotes particular attention to radically reequipping institutes and plants in the light of the increasing conversion of military production. Enterprises' fixed capital is not now in line with modern technical and ecological requirements, or with the new concepts of safety in the production, storage, and transportation of nuclear materials. This 20-year program envisages, in particular, the following items of expenditure: R3 billion on personnel safety enhancement, environmental protection, and the burial of radioactive waste; R3 billion on the development of enterprises' computer capacities, where there is a colossal lag in relation to the United States; R2 billion

on the renewal of experimental and diagnostic facilities; R1 billion on the mothballing of existing reactors for the production of plutonium and tritium; and R1 billion on the creation of facilities for stockpiling active nuclear materials obtained from the dismantling and destruction of nuclear munitions.

The fulfillment of this program will make it possible to react flexibly to trends in the world community in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, and will increase the technological level of conversion operations.

We have stopped the production of weapons-grade uranium. By the year 2000 all 13 industrial reactors for the production of new plutonium will be eliminated (today four plutonium production reactors are in operation, and by 1996 only two will be in operation).

The outline plan for modernization makes provision for budget financing of the modernization and development of enterprises allowing for an increase in conversion operations to 60 percent by the year 2000, including ecological recovery of territories, the creation of fiber-optic equipment for television and communications, the development of radioisotope and nuclear medicine, the creation of highly durable tools and high-precision machine tools for the processing of complex structures, the creation of new compound materials, the production of mobile laboratories for ecological analyses of the environment, the production of promising high-purity materials, and so forth. In a number of spheres, associations have already been set up on the basis of science and production facilities, and I think the formation of joint-stock companies is on the agenda.

Today, an average of some 30 percent of the science and production capacities of the nuclear weapons complex are already working for the national economy, of which some 5 percent is directly involved in consumer goods production. It is planned to double consumer goods production by 1995. It is planned to produce the scarcest, high-tech goods, such as digital video and audio recorders, laser disc players and discs, microwave ovens, electronic security locks, and many other goods in high demand. Centralized state investments are also needed in this sphere. Centralized coordination of conversion operations in the nuclear weapons complex is one of the main conditions for ensuring the nonproliferation of technologies developed in the complex—a very sensitive and crucial state problem. Attracting foreign investments will also do much to determine the success of this conversion program and the time scale for its implementation.

The current costs of maintaining the nuclear weapons complex have cost us R10 a year for every one of our compatriots, R10 each a year!—that is the price of our independence and our dignity. Every one of us has given less than R1 a month to maintain the country's nuclear potential.

I think it is necessary today not only to materially support this sector, the country's pride, but also to ensure social protection of their work and life. The benefit derived from these collectives for all spheres of the country's activity, both for defense and for the national economy, will surpass all expectations. Thanks to the high skills and selfless labor of scientists, designers, and workers, thanks to efficient organization of labor and high labor and technological discipline, these collectives have achieved scientific and technical results up to the best world standards. It is state support for such complexes today and the thrifty utilization of the enterprises' scientific potential and fixed capital that will ensure the country's scientific and technical progress in future.

And in our age, without scientific and technical progress there is no future for the country or the people!

The Planet's Safety

Today, while officially acknowledging that nuclear war will lead to catastrophe and that it must not happen, the United States, in its new doctrine of "deterrence," attaches great significance to improving its nuclear arsenal.

It must be observed that the West has not yet officially renounced the right to the first nuclear strike, and is continuing to improve its nuclear forces, exploiting its advantages in technology and in attaching priority to developments relating to nuclear warheads for strategic offensive weapons, including missile complexes with individually targeted warheads accurate to within 100 meters and with the potential to destroy highly protected targets.

The doctrine of defense sufficiency and our international commitments on reducing the nuclear arsenal and non-first-use of nuclear weapons affect the composition [sostav] of nuclear weapons and require qualitative improvements.

The research physicists have always devoted particular attention to questions of the safety of nuclear weapons in production, storage, and handling, first and foremost through the development of physical designs for the structure of nuclear weapons which rule out in principle the possibility of a nuclear explosion in any unauthorized circumstances.

Enhancing safety is today the priority objective of the nuclear weapons program. Technical achievements make it possible to carry out major improvements as regards the safety of weapons from the moment of their creation.

Since the consequences of an accident or the deliberate theft of nuclear weapons are extremely dangerous both politically and physically, all measures have always been taken to protect them against the possibility of an unauthorized nuclear explosion or the dangerous dispersal of radioactive substances.

However, "How safe is safe?" and "What compromise should be reached from the viewpoint of military characteristics and the further enhancement of safety?"—these are highly complex questions where nuclear weapons are concerned. The safety problem has always been dealt with on the basis of military-political doctrine. Today the world is changing, and the main aspects are shifting in the direction of safety.

It is necessary to stress the exceptional complexity of the problem of the safety of nuclear weapons complexes and the need for analysis using three-dimensional models, with the closest possible approximations to a nuclear explosion.

A nuclear warhead itself is a complex, I would say unique, technical device combining modern electronic devices and generators, nuclear-active materials, and conventional explosives. The operation of these devices is synchronized to 100-millionth parts of a second in an automated system according to control commands. Naturally, the service life of such devices is limited, as with any other highly complex electronic equipment.

In the process of designing nuclear weapons, it is necessary to deal with their real three-dimensional geometry. As of today the potential for high-speed operation of our latest supercomputers does not allow us sufficiently accurately to describe all the development processes of hydrodynamic and neutral processes.

And then, in the context of a nuclear explosion, it is necessary to deal with a substance at temperatures on the order of a hundred million degrees and at pressures of hundreds of millions of atmospheres, and with the transfer of heat and neutrons within the substance in a geometry that is changing at ultra-high speed, on a time scale on the order of one billionth of a second, against the background of a variable-speed fission chain reaction.

Our potential for going over from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional model is today tens of times less than what is available in the U.S. national nuclear laboratories. However, even three-dimensional models do not to a sufficient extent describe all the sensitive aspects of the kinetics of detonation of conventional explosives and the chain reaction of nuclear fission and fusion.

The considerably smaller financial potential, the great laggardness of our laboratory and computer facilities—all this was made up for by the resourcefulness of our scientists and designers, and, most important, by a number of nuclear tests approximately equal to that of the Americans—this being the only way to obtain experimental information on the physical processes that take place in the extreme conditions of a nuclear explosion.

Nuclear tests are an integral part of scientific research, experimental, and design work. It must be noted that the United States, where the Nevada test range is managed

by the Department of Energy, spends some \$500 million on nuclear tests annually, which is 10 times higher than our spending.

In the USSR underground nuclear tests were conducted at two Defense Ministry test ranges: the Semipalatinsk range and the Northern range (the Novaya Zemlya islands).

Since 1949 a total of 467 nuclear weapon tests have been conducted at the Semipalatinsk range, of which 343 were underground, and at the Northern range, beginning in 1955, there have been 132 nuclear weapon tests, 42 of them underground.

In recent years the atmosphere surrounding the activity of nuclear test ranges has deteriorated sharply. The perestroika processes in our country led to an improvement in the military-political atmosphere in the world and determined the paramountcy of panhuman values. The antinuclear movement is growing among the world public.

However, persistent demands for the unilateral cessation of tests led to an unpredictable and unstable atmosphere in connection with our nuclear tests and a steep reduction in the nuclear test program in the last six years, which has brought the nuclear weapons complex to the point where irreversible degenerative processes could begin. The physical processes taking place in a nuclear explosion cannot be simulated in laboratory conditions, and nuclear tests of nuclear weapons remain the only way to test their viability, reliability, and safety.

In this situation, guided by the objectives and principles of the ratified Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, I consider it possible to limit our underground nuclear weapon tests to only the minimum number necessary. Of course, in order to provide guarantees against unexpected political or technical events affecting the country's defense potential, it is necessary to enshrine in an international or bilateral agreement the annual minimum number of nuclear weapon tests.

Let me remind you that in 1990 the United States conducted nine tests, France six, and China two. Our country conducted one test, at the Northern range.

In 1991 the United States conducted eight nuclear tests at the Nevada test range, and France conducted six tests in the Pacific. Again, our test ranges are silent! And they will be silent until the end of 1992, if the Americans do not follow the example of our unilateral moratorium. In effect our test ranges will have been silent for two years in succession—1991 and 1992.

Following our example, in April France declared a moratorium on nuclear tests until the end of 1992. The United States has the last word, and the whole world awaits this step.

On Test Ranges and Tests

The problem of nuclear tests has such an important bearing on the scientific aspects that it is difficult not to raise them in broader terms.

The geographical location and geological structure of the Novaya Zemlya islands, unlike the region of the Semipalatinsk range, are such as to ensure the complete safety of the population of regions close to the range territory—safety from both the radiation effects and the seismic effects of underground nuclear tests with a yield of up to 150 kilotonnes. The peculiarities of the geological formation of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, in view of its aseismic nature and absence of ground water, create the conditions for the complete containment of the products of the nuclear explosion within the underground reaches of the archipelago.

The distance of the range's test sites from the nearest cities, Amderma, Naryn-Mar, Vorkuta, Murmansk, and Arkhangelsk, is 250, 400, 500, 900, and 1,000 km respectively, whereas the city of Semipalatinsk is 90 km from the Kazakhstan range, while the nearest settlement to it, Komsomolskiy, with its population of 10,000, is 40 km away, that is, within the heightened risk zone of the Semipalatinsk range. Let me remind you that although the Nevada test range in the United States is 130 km from the major city of Las Vegas, with a population of a million during the summer vacation period, the actual distance to the test site is some 200 km.

Undoubtedly, during air and surface tests damage was done to the health of the population around the test range. People who suffered as a result of the surface and air nuclear tests of 1949-1962, irrespective of their present domicile, should be on an equal footing with the victims of the Chernobyl disaster as regards benefits.

There are now certain sectors of the surface area of the test ranges which were contaminated in the course of surface and air nuclear explosions, and access to these territories should be restricted.

The switch to underground nuclear tests was an important step both in improving the ecological situation and in reducing the number of tests annually.

It is important that underground nuclear tests, given sufficient depth of emplacement of the nuclear device and durable hermetic sealing of the emplacement of the device in the ground, and given appropriate meteorological conditions at the moment of the explosion and for two or three days after it and compliance with many other organizational and technical safety measures, can minimize the ecological damage on the territory of the nuclear test range and cause virtually no harm to the inhabitants and territory of the country outside the test range. The territory of a nuclear test range usually consists of something like a few thousand square kilometers.

From the very beginning of underground tests all measures were taken to ensure that virtually no radioactive products came to the surface. The technology for containing radioactive products was constantly improved, and, for instance, during the joint experiment with the United States in 1988 the participants in the experiment and journalists were able to be present at the epicenter of a 150-kilotonne explosion 45 minutes later, at the Semipalatinsk range.

The radiation safety of underground nuclear tests involves a range of technical and organizational measures to prevent accident situations or limit their consequences and prevent the population from receiving radiation doses higher than the international norms. The general algorithms of operations to prepare for a specific underground explosion at a test range in our country are analogous to those in America, as we discovered in the joint verification experiment.

In the context of the distrust of the world public and our own public toward the nuclear industry, I consider it necessary to formulate procedures for international or bilateral verification of safety in conducting underground nuclear explosions. The necessary preconditions exist in this sphere for the conclusion of an agreement or treaty on the criteria and procedures for their verification in conducting underground nuclear explosions.

In view of the above, I consider it necessary, within the framework of the CIS, to assign [zatverdit] legislatively to Kazakhstan and Russia in the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, signed in Moscow in 1974, and in the protocol to it signed in Washington in 1990:

- the ending of nuclear weapon tests at the Semipalatinsk range in Kazakhstan, which has borne the brunt of nuclear tests since 1949;
- in order to ensure the sufficient defense of our country and to guarantee against unexpected political or technical events affecting the military balance: not only the preservation, but also the modernization of specific facilities at the Northern range in order to ensure verification of tests on the site of the implementation of nuclear explosions in accordance with the ratified 1974 treaty and the 1990 protocol to it.

In view of the need to maintain the country's defense sufficiency, it is proposed to conduct up to two to four [do 2-4] underground nuclear weapon tests at that range in subsequent years. Formerly we carried out an average of two underground tests a year at that range in the period 1964-1990, and in some years there were up to three or four underground nuclear tests.

Thus it is a question of reducing our test program by a factor of four, that is, from an average of 15 tests a year at the country's two ranges, to four tests. This reduction in tests, in the light of enhanced safety requirements, will make it possible to formulate new approaches both to

conducting the tests themselves and to increasing the effectiveness of diagnostics of physical processes ensuing in an underground nuclear explosion.

Incidentally, you may hear it said today that the idea of continuing tests is upheld by those who earn big money and receive substantial benefits as a result. Don't believe it! This is said by people whose aim in life is not the service of the Fatherland, but political capital, money, and privileges. For the nuclear weapon testers there has always been only one privilege—that of being in the front ranks in curbing the nuclear elements.

Yeltsin To Discuss Test Ban in Washington

LD1105180992 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1110 GMT 11 May 92

[Commentary By Vadim Solovyev]

[Text] While paying an official visit to Washington in June the Russian President Boris Yeltsin intends to hold talks on prohibiting nuclear tests. A commentary by Vadim Solovyev.

It should be reminded [as heard] that the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water is being strictly observed by nearly 120 states, let alone the treaties between the United States and the former Soviet Union on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, underground nuclear tests continue. Up to now more than 1,300 of them have been registered.

Each country seems to have been acting at its own discretion in respect of underground explosions. Russia has proclaimed a full scale unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and in the former USSR nuclear test fields were silent for years. The Russian leadership has welcomed the recent decision by France to suspend its nuclear explosions till the end of the year. China has also been abstaining from nuclear tests.

The United States has been carrying on testing nuclear charges within the fixed threshold of 17 underground explosions per year. The last one, with a yield of 20 kilotons [as received], was blasted on 30 April, for the purpose of studying the effects of nuclear explosions on various types of arms and ammunition. Apart from the fact that these explosions are not at all harmless for the nature, they trigger off thoughts of a chain of reactions in the minds of military, including Russia's, with the growing belief among them that since somewhere nuclear tests are being conducted then they are necessary and neither laboratory designing nor theoretical studies can successfully replace them.

According to some infiltrating data, the Russian President Boris Yeltsin is inclined to resume nuclear tests if there are no visible shifts in this domain. But an ultimate decision will apparently depend on the outcome of his talks with George Bush in Washington where he intends

to achieve agreement on either a complete ban on nuclear tests or a threshold of no more than two explosions per year. The present relations between the United States and Russia create favorable conditions for resolving issues on nuclear disarmament.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Reports of Chemical Weapons in Karabakh Denied

PM1205143792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 May 92 Moscow Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel V. Tarapat, CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff specialist, by military journalist Ivan Sas; date, place not given: "Maybe Chemical Weapons Are Being Made in Transcaucasus"—first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] In the Karabakh conflict Armenia is using chemical weapons left behind by CIS troops—this report was carried in the mass media recently. Colonel V. Tarapat, specialist of the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff, comments on it at our request.

[Tarapat] I can say one thing: There have been and are no chemical weapons belonging to the CIS Joint Armed Forces in that region. A special memorandum with the United States was signed in 1989. We exchanged information on the sites where chemical weapons were located on the territory both of the former USSR and of the United States. It was declared at that time that absolutely all chemical weapons belonging to the Armed Forces were kept only at seven installations and exclusively on the territory of Russia and that there were no such weapons outside Russia.

[Sas] There are now frequent cases of attacks on weapons dumps and military units. Could chemical ammunition not have found its way like this from Russian territory to Karabakh?

[Tarapat] Such a possibility is also ruled out. No losses of chemical weapons belonging to the CIS Joint Armed Forces have been noted. All installations where chemical weapons are kept are under special control.

I believe that overt disinformation is taking place. As a specialist, I can see with my naked eye details which undermine confidence in it. It is reported, for example, that the city of Shusha was shelled with 122mm shells packed with cyanide. But we simply do not have such ammunition in our arsenal. Another time there was talk of 120mm shells packed with needle-like fragments impregnated with cyanide. A specialist will at once determine that the CIS Joint Armed Forces do not have ammunition of that caliber with such contents either.

The possibility that weapons manufactured on the spot have been used cannot be ruled out. There are chemical production facilities in the Transcaucasus, and it is

possible in principle to organize the production of certain potent toxic substances and to charge ammunition with them.

The information available, however, is clearly insufficient to draw unambiguous conclusions. For this you must familiarize yourself with the conclusion of specialists who have worked on the spot and with the materials of an investigation, from which it would be possible to extract data on the nature of the lesions. Unfortunately, we do not yet possess these materials.

Yeltsin's Biological Weapons Decree Assessed

LD1505142592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 0810 GMT 15 May 92

[Commentary by Boris Belitskiy]

[Text] [Announcer] President Boris Yeltsin of Russia last month issued a decree on assuring the fulfillment of the country's international commitments in the field of biological weapons. Some details from our science correspondent, Boris Belitskiy.

The decree forbids drawing up or implementing military biological programs in violation of the international convention on this subject adopted back in 1972 and ratified by the Soviet Union three years later. Since then this is the first legal document in the country on these matters. Well, better late than never. Enforcement of the ban has now been assigned to a committee on conventional problems of chemical and biological warfare. The committee is directly under the president. Here is what we were told by the chairman of this committee, Dr. Anatoliy Kuntsevich.

Dr. Kuntsevich said that after the ratification of the international convention there were, legally speaking, violations of it in this country. Since there were no bans, research in this field continued. It continued even after 1975 when the USSR ratified the international convention. It was only in the mid-eighties that steps began to be taken to curtail these offensive programs. That was when preparations began for United Nations conferences on the problems of biological warfare.

But although the programs were gradually wound down, still there was no legal action on a total ban. This has come only now. The chairman of the presidential committee, Dr. Kuntsevich, confirmed that there are now no stockpiles of biological warfare agents in Russia. Indeed he explained that the agents that had been developed had a short storage life, which made stockpiling impossible. Actually there was laboratory research and the testing of the product of this research at the country's only proving ground for this purpose. All work at that proving ground has now been halted and the special purpose structures erected there are to be dismantled within a couple of years. I saw the specialized research facilities. They are now to be (?regeared) to serving civilian needs, such as the need for pharmaceuticals and to do basic research.

To prove this foreign experts have been invited to the recently top secret military facility. The foreign experts will be able to take part in evaluating the project and in formulating policies for converting military oriented biological work to civilian needs and working out (the measures to improve this). Dr. Kuntsevich had this to say on the subject.

Dr. Kuntsevich said the presidential decree also requires that their committee draft proposals to extend openness, trust and international cooperation within the framework of the convention. The committee chairman says their proposals will call for a substantial change of the control mechanism, that it consists not of national groups acting separately but of mixed groups. International experts [word indistinct] it is also necessary to follow the trends of biological research and evaluate them from the standpoint of their potential for developing new types of warfare agents. Such a possibility must be ruled out.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Further on Black Sea Peace Zone Proposal

Turkish, NATO Attitude Viewed

MK0705110092 Moscow KURANTY in Russian
7 May 92 p 2

[Article by Mikhail Shchipanov: "Fleet on Their Mind"]

[Text] Ukraine and Turkey have jointly called for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the Black Sea basin. Naturally, the idea in itself requires the most active support of the littoral states, the number of which has sharply increased. If only the fair Turkish-Ukrainian concept was also supplemented by a plan for the consistent "denuclearization" of the "neighboring" Mediterranean Sea. But then, in the event of a visit to Black Sea waters by a friendly detachment of American warships (such instances will be more frequent in the near future), a few problems would arise in connection with the purity of the region's status. Because the Yankees, in their best traditions, never confirm or refute information on the presence of "nuclear playthings" on board their frigates and battleships.

But, evidently, Ankara has not ventured to threaten a zone of NATO influence—the Mediterranean: Problems with its bloc partners may arise. While Ukraine is more concerned about the problems of the Black Sea. And why this is is well known.

On the one hand, Kiev—as many important dignitaries have asserted—is ready to take into its hands virtually the entire Black Sea Fleet. On the other hand, for many reasons it is impossible to fly the yellow-and-blue flag from ships carrying nuclear munitions. It is quite possible to resolve the evident contradiction by eliminating nuclear weapons as a class in the Black Sea basin.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Declaration

LD0905223392 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1600 GMT 9 May 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has prepared a declaration on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Black Sea region and the proclamation of the Black Sea basin as a peace zone.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Ukrainian Official Confirms No Tactical Weapons Left

LD0805194492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1727 GMT 8 May 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksey Petrunya for TASS]

[Text] Kiev May 8 TASS—Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Bizhan [name as received] told a briefing at the Foreign Ministry's press centre here today that "not a single tactical nuclear weapon remains on Ukrainian territory".

According to Bizhan, the only nuclear weapons remaining on Ukrainian territory are 176 strategic missiles and strategic aviation ammunition. There are plans to eliminate them by the end of 1994, but Bizhan was doubtful that the deadline was plausible. He explained his doubts by pointing to the fact that many missiles were using liquid fuel and siphoning this fuel away was a lengthy, costly and environmentally hazardous process. Ukraine is unable to perform the operation itself and needs assistance from the West.

According to the deputy defence minister, the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons, including those with the Black Sea Fleet, the fleet ceases to be a strategic force.

U.S. 'Middleman' Role in Treaty Issues Viewed

PM1105102192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 May 92 p 3

[Commentary by Observer Aleksandr Golts: "Disputes Over Nuclear Weapons in CIS Being Solved...in Washington"]

[Text] Irrespective of what they say, those who accuse the CIS leaders of simply failing to create coordinating organs within the Commonwealth framework are not correct. In actual fact these organs already exist. Only not in Minsk, as was originally envisaged, but in Washington. The latest evidence of this was Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk's visit to the United States.

It did not escape the U.S. press that G. Bush, despite his own extremely tight schedule, organized a great many visible displays of hospitality: from a ceremonial signing of documents to a 21-gun salute. In a word, everything possible was done to ensure that the guest from Kiev did not feel in any way slighted compared with B. Yeltsin, who has already been received in Washington. Bush even whisked Kravchuk away to spend a few minutes at Camp David, the country residence of U.S. presidents—a visit to which has become a symbol to our leaders of some kind of relations of trust with the White House incumbent.

The demonstrative hospitality was, by all accounts, to soften the tough conversation the Americans had with Kravchuk. I recall that the position of Ukraine, which wanted without fail to become a party to the Strategic Offensive Weapons (START) Treaty, retarded its ratification.

In Washington the Ukrainian leader was apparently led to believe that the United States will not tolerate any political games over the former USSR's nuclear weapons. The exhortations did the trick. As a result of the talks between the chiefs of the two countries' foreign policy departments all problems, as if by the wave of a magic wand, were settled. And as Kravchuk stated after the signing of a protocol on implementing the START Treaty (the very same one that was fruitlessly discussed among our four "nuclear republics"), Ukraine will fulfill all obligations ensuing from the treaty.

Here the Ukrainian leader tried without particular success to obtain specific security guarantees from Washington. According to him, "in certain neighboring countries, especially in such a large country as Russia, there are political forces which would like to make territorial claims against Ukraine." But Washington thought it unnecessary to tie itself to additional promises, which in the long term could draw it even deeper into the disputes between the CIS republics.

Especially as, having agreed with Ukraine, U.S. diplomats are by no means ending their work. A new problem is appearing on the horizon—the position of Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev. In an interview with a U.S. newspaper he too stated his intention to obtain security guarantees from the United States, Russia, and China in exchange for a commitment to relinquish nuclear weapons.

He also stated that Kazakhstan is prepared to adhere to the provisions of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as "a republic on whose territory nuclear weapons are temporarily stationed." But this approach does not at all satisfy the United States, which, in THE WASHINGTON POST's opinion, wants Kazakhstan to sign this treaty as a nonnuclear country. However, in the same interview Nazarbayev hinted that a solution could be found. Of course, when he comes to Washington next month....

I completely fail to understand why our Commonwealth leaders want to solve the problems associated with fulfilling the already signed START Treaty exclusively

through a U.S. middleman and obligatorily in Washington, rather than with each other. I do not want to accuse anyone of playing politics, but the arguments regarding "security guarantees" seem to be to a large extent merely grounds for raising one's international status. And for getting one's share of salutes and ceremonial receptions.

However, this status does not so much rise as fall from these games.

Commentary on Ukraine Tactical, Strategic Arms Removal

LD100517492 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 9 May 92

[Commentary by Military Analyst Vadim Solovyev]

[Text] A few days ago the last of the tactical nuclear weapons were removed from Ukraine to Russia. Military analyst Vadim Solovyev says.

The transfer was completed almost two months ahead of schedule so that all the tactical nuclear weapons under the Commonwealth command are now stationed in Russia. True, there were complications—Ukraine first made unilateral moves to interrupt the removal and then was surprised to hear the removal had been completed and attempted to disprove this. Nonetheless, the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan has been completed well before the deadline of 1 July, and by the year of 2000 the weapons will be destroyed at special plants in the Russian Federation. Ukraine and other Commonwealth republics will be entitled to monitor the destruction. What about the strategic nuclear weapons? The Commonwealth heads of state have already decided their fate, and the command of the Commonwealth Armed Forces is already working to implement the decision. The deputy chief of staff of an agency under the command of the Commonwealth's Armed Forces, Vitaliy Yakovlev, says: Only strategic nuclear weapons have remained in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Byelarus. The START treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the United States a year ago has a binding force on the three republics. Its provisions must be effected within seven years. The three republics have declared that strategic nuclear weapons will be removed from their territories by the end of 1994. So far, we are busy with paper work but sometime later this year the actual removal will be likely to start. No problems have been reported. We're working hand-in-hand. The deadlines must be specified though. It's obvious however that Ukraine and Kazakhstan are toying with the idea of attaining the nuclear status. Can they use the nuclear weapons stored on their territory against neighboring countries? Vitaliy Yakovlev comments: Legally speaking the Russian president is the only official who can push the nuclear button with

consent from the heads of state of the other Commonwealth republics. Secondly, there's the technical angle—neither Ukraine nor Kazakhstan is technically capable of using the nuclear weapons of its own will. Their status can be compared to that of Turkey, which has American missiles on its territory; neither Turkish nor Ukrainian or Kazakh presidents are technically capable of pushing the nuclear button, even though strategic nuclear weapons are stationed in their republics. General Vitaliy Yakovlev of the command of the Commonwealth Armed Forces.

Reports on Issue of Nuclear Arms in Black Sea Fleet

CIS Command: No Nuclear Arms

LD0905123192 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1211 GMT 9 May 92

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Roman Zadunaitskiy]

[Text] Moscow May 9 TASS—"There are neither tactical nuclear weapons nor nuclear charges on ships or submarines of the Black Sea fleet despite Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's statements in Washington," Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces Command said on Saturday [9 May], quoting the Black Sea fleet officials.

Further Report

LD1105165292 Moscow *Mayak Radio Network*
in Russian 1530 GMT 11 May 92

[Text] Nikolay Medvedev, chief of the press center of the united CIS Armed Forces, in a conversation with an *ITAR-TASS* correspondent, has denied the statement by Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk that several units of tactical nuclear weapons remain on the Black Sea Fleet. Kravchuk made this statement on 7 May during his visit to the United States.

The press center of the CIS's United Armed Forces, said Nikolay Medvedev, has at its disposal trustworthy information officially confirmed by the chief command's office of the CIS's United Armed Forces and the command of the Black Sea Fleet that there is no nuclear ammunition on the ships and submarines of the Black Sea Fleet.

'Contradictory' Arms Claims Undermine Prestige

PM1405105992 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 13 May 92 p 3

[Report by *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov: "No Nuclear Weapons in Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] Moscow—The CIS Joint Armed Forces Press Center has expressed concern in connection with the Ukrainian leadership's claims regarding tactical nuclear weapons. During a conversation with an *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Nikolay Medvedev, chief of the CIS Joint

Armed Forces Press Center, denied the statement made by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk 7 May during his U.S. visit to the effect that there are still a few tactical weapons in the Black Sea Fleet.

The CIS Joint Armed Forces Press Center has reliable information, Nikolay Medvedev said, officially confirmed by the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command and the Black Sea Fleet Command to the effect that there is no nuclear ammunition on Black Sea Fleet ships and submarines.

Previously the Ukrainian leadership had denied and then more than a day later confirmed the CIS Joint Armed Forces announcement that the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the republic's territory was completed in full during the night of 5-6 May.

According to the head of the press center, the contradictory statements made by Ukrainian leaders regarding the existence of nuclear weapons on the republic's territory undermines the prestige not only of Ukraine but of the entire Commonwealth in the eyes of the international community on such an important issue as nuclear arms control.

Fleet Reaffirms No Nuclear Charges

PM1805082392 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 14 May 92 p 2

[Report by Captain First Rank A. Pilipchuk: "Military Confirms Yet Again: Tactical Nuclear Weapons Have Been Withdrawn from Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] After telling its readers of official information received through *ITAR-TASS* channels that the CIS Joint Armed Forces Press Center (*KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* 13 May this year) had denied the Ukrainian leaders' statements about the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in the Black Sea Fleet, *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in turn contacted Rear Admiral Anatoliy Manchenko, first deputy chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet.

"According to my information," Anatoliy Manchenko reported, "not one tactical nuclear charge is left on the fleet's ships today."

Captain First Rank Valeriy Novikov, chief of the CIS Navy Press Service, confirmed:

"Nobody has any grounds for claiming the opposite."

At the same time Valeriy Novikov cited assertions by the Navy command and corresponding documents which he has been able to see.

Republics' Nuclear 'Trend' Worries NATO*PM1405093192 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 May 92 p 3*

[Correspondent Vladimir Peresada report under the "Correspondent Comments" rubric: "NATO Demands of CIS That There Be a Single Nuclear Successor"]

[Text] Brussels—A briefing for journalists has been held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Serious concern was expressed over the future of the nuclear potential on CIS territory.

Answering a question from me about the reasons for this concern, a high-ranking NATO representative said: "There are sufficient grounds for thinking that a trend toward the emergence of several nuclear states in place of the former USSR has started. Such a course of events would be completely at variance with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons."

The statements made by Presidents Kravchuk and Nazarbayev not so long ago have given rise to suspicions in NATO that Ukraine and Kazakhstan do nevertheless intend to consider the nuclear weapons on their territory as theirs. In this regard the organizers of the briefing recalled that the North Atlantic Alliance recently issued a statement which read as follows: "NATO member countries expect Russia to play the same role as the former Soviet Union."

Neither the presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of former Soviet republics nor the fact that activity connected with their testing (meaning Kazakhstan—V.P.) was carried out there can serve as the basis for considering them the possessors of nuclear weapons under treaty articles, it continues.

If you ask why, one of the arguments being employed by NATO is based on the generally recognized concept of "the status of a nuclear power." It assumes such a power possesses a complete nuclear complex, which, in addition to the raw material, that is, fissile material, includes production capacities, scientific research institutes connected with the servicing and storage of warheads, and a number of other military and civil structures. Russia alone has a complete nuclear complex.

When Western recognition of the CIS states and, in particular, their admission to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was recently discussed, their accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the key issue. And appropriate commitments were assumed by them. They were enshrined in a joint statement by the foreign ministers of NACC countries on 10 March and a joint statement by the defense ministers of those countries on 1 April.

It is clear from all that I have heard here that the West will be persistently seeking to ensure that the membership of the "nuclear club"—the United States, Britain, France, China, and now Russia, instead of the USSR—is not expanded in any circumstances.

CIS Continues To Control Strategic Forces*LD1505211992 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 15 May 92*

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] A briefing of the CIS unified armed forces took place in Moscow today. It was announced at the briefing that, although the Russian armed forces envisage strategic nuclear forces, nuclear weapons will continue to remain under the control of the leadership of CIS troops. It will stay this way as long as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Byelarus remain nuclear powers.

Reports, Comments on Kazakh Policy**Good Prospects for Nazarbayev in U.S.***LD1805170592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1110 GMT 18 May 92*

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] Kravchuk, Nazarbayev, Yeltsin. This is the sequence in which Washington receives the leaders of former Soviet republics having a special role in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the United States has special interest in each of them. However, there is one common problem: that is, nuclear disarmament. To mutual satisfaction, the agreements concluded by Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan on the withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads to Russia for storage and scrapping has already been carried out. I would point to the fact that a certain role has been played by the firm position of the United States, which voiced its concern when Ukraine suspended the withdrawal of nuclear warheads. It was during President Kravchuk's visit to the United States earlier this month that the last train carrying nuclear warheads left Ukraine for Russia.

However, the future of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, signed by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev on the 31st of last July, has remained unclear. Russia is for the early ratification of the treaty and the implementation of the reciprocal proposals made by President Bush and President Yeltsin for greater nuclear arms cuts. However, the three other nuclear member-states of the CIS—Byelarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—have been taking their special position. They said they would like to have the status of temporarily nuclear powers, unprecedented in world practice. This intention caused surprise and fear in the West. Kazakhstan has now dropped this idea.

It has been announced in Alma-Ata that the treaty of collective security signed at the Tashkent CIS summit has produced a qualitatively new situation. Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry says the treaty of collective security has become an important legal instrument of stability in a greater part of Europe and Asia.

Besides, the statement says it has been agreed that Kazakhstan will become a full-fledged participant in the

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Alma-Ata has also been promised by the United States that it will receive early assistance if faced with aggression or threat. The Kazakh Foreign Ministry says thereby the necessary conditions have been established for Kazakhstan to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in the capacity of a nonnuclear state. Besides, it will reserve the right to control the nonuse and reduction of the nuclear arms temporarily present on its territory.

One can be quite certain that the Kazakh president's visit to the United States is starting on a good note. There are good chances for achieving tangible results, not just in the sphere of relations between Kazakhstan and the United States but in the sphere of international security, in the first place security in Eurasia, something that Russia is very much interested in as well.

Kazakhstan To Comply With START

*LD1805104192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1019 GMT 18 May 92*

[Report by ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow May 18 TASS—"We fully recognise the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and we shall fully comply with the obligations the USSR assumed with regard to the United States," Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev said on Monday [18 May]. Heading for the United States on an official visit, he stopped over in Moscow on the way from Alma-Ata to Washington. He answered questions from reporters in Moscow Airport.

Nazarbayev also said that Kazakhstan joins the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. "In his letter U.S. President George Bush has recently informed me that he accepts our proposal that Kazakhstan become a participant in the START process and in the negotiations on the further reduction of strategic offensive arms, ratify the START treaty on its own and present the instrument of ratification to the United States," Kazakhstan's president said.

Nazarbayev said that he met with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on Sunday. Matters of foreign and home policy were discussed. "We agreed that after the fulfilment of the START treaty the question of further cuts in nuclear arms stationed in Kazakhstan's territory will be decided by Russia and Kazakhstan. "Russia is now Kazakhstan's military and political ally," Nazarbayev said. Answering a question, the Kazakh president said that "the matter of providing the Kazakh territory for the purpose of common defence and deployment of nuclear missiles will be decided on mutually advantageous terms."

Nazarbayev noted a constructive nature of the summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) held in Tashkent last Friday. He noted particularly that the conclusion of the treaty on collective security by member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States

"will serve as a basis for our civilised unity, not separation." He said that the CIS countries that form their own armies will not be using them against each other. The parties to the treaty assume the obligation that if any one of them is subjected to aggression or is threatened with aggression, this will be regarded as an attack or the threat of attack against all of them." "We thus reassure our peoples and above all create a normal base for the further existence of the army," the Kazakh president said.

He also declared for creating coordinating bodies of the Commonwealth. "On the basis of decisions of heads of state an economic court is being formed to monitor the observance of obligations under treaty. We began working out the charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Commonwealth is thus being consolidated," Nazarbayev said.

Dwelling on the purposes of his visit to the United States, the Kazakh president said he is not going to ask President Bush for anything. "The only thing I intend to do is to tell American businessmen: come to Kazakhstan and work in conditions of mutual advantage," Nazarbayev said.

Nazarbayev Cites Two Reasons

*LD1805082892 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0800 GMT 18 May 92*

[Text] Kazakhstan intends to join the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and to become a nonnuclear state, Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of the republic, stated today before leaving Moscow for Washington, according to a report by the NEGA Agency.

He gave two reasons for the change in Kazakhstan's position. In the first place, the republic has become a member of the CIS collective security council, and secondly, George Bush, President of the United States, has recognized Kazakhstan as an independent participant of the treaty process for reducing and limiting strategic offensive weapons.

We have reported already that Nursultan Nazarbayev met Boris Yeltsin, president of Russia, in Moscow yesterday. According to the NEGA Agency, an understanding was reached during their meeting about the further reduction of nuclear weapons on the territory of Kazakhstan once the agreement on strategic offensive weapons has been implemented.

Comments Further

*PM1805143292 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 May 92 Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by Gennadiy Charodeyev: "I Do Not Intend To Ask the Americans for Anything," Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev Stated Before Leaving for Washington"]

[Text] This first official visit is in response to an invitation issued earlier by U.S. President G. Bush. Its main aim is to establish direct cooperation with the United

States in the spheres of the economy, trade, science, and culture. In Washington and New York N. Nazarbayev will hold talks with White House leaders and meet with U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney, prominent U.S. senators and diplomats, and also bankers and farmers.

Before leaving for Washington the Kazakh president held a news conference at Vnukovo-2 airport for Russian and foreign journalists. He stated that he does not intend to ask the White House for anything during his visit to the United States. "I intend," he said, "to call on businesspeople in America to cooperate with Kazakhstan on mutually beneficial terms."

Answering a question from IZVESTIYA's correspondent on Kazakhstan's position on the question of nuclear disarmament, N. Nazarbayev stated:

"As you know, at the meeting of CIS presidents in Tashkent we signed an agreement on collective security. In this way, I believe, the nuclear umbrella over Kazakhstan is secured. Furthermore, a recent message from President G. Bush says that the United States accepts the proposal that our republic should be a party to the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty [START] process. We also confirm that Kazakhstan will participate in talks on the further reduction of strategic arms and will ratify the treaty autonomously and present instruments of ratification to the Americans.

"The United States declared earlier that it assumes commitments relating to the defense of nuclear-free states in the event of a nuclear attack on them. We support that position and declare that we fully recognize the START Treaty. We will fulfill completely the commitments of the former USSR to the United States under that treaty, and we also intend to accede to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The question of the continued presence of nuclear arms on Kazakhstan's territory after the fulfillment of the START Treaty will be dealt with by agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan."

N. Nazarbayev told journalists that there are plans for a meeting of foreign ministers from Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and the United States in Lisbon soon, at which a date will be set for signing the START Treaty.

"At the Tashkent meeting," the Kazakh president said, "I learned from Marshal Shaposhnikov's report, to my great surprise, that a month ago the Ukrainian president issued a decree on creating their own nuclear forces. Incidentally, L. Kravchuk did not make a single statement about this during his trip to the United States. So is Ukraine becoming a nuclear state? I cannot understand this stance. Russia also intends to create its own nuclear forces. But I think it should indeed remain a nuclear state. The whole world is concerned to ensure that these lethal weapons do not proliferate across the planet."

The Kazakh president announced that during his trip he plans to open a Kazakh embassy in Washington. An agreement in principle was reached earlier on this question with Russia. The Russian Embassy in the United States will make official premises and communications channels available to the diplomats from Kazakhstan.

Meets With Baker

LD1905073892 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
0702 GMT 19 May 92

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Vanichkin and Ivan Lebedev]

[Text] Washington, May 19 TASS—Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, currently on an official visit to Washington, met on Monday [18 May] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. He told a press conference, held here on the same day, that the sides had devoted much attention to controls over nuclear armaments.

"Today, I can outline with absolute clarity our stand on the problem of nuclear armaments," Nazarbayev noted. "After the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, four republics of the former USSR—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Byelorussia, where nuclear weapons are sited—signed an agreement, stipulating that they all would join the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. True, Ukraine and Byelorussia signed the document as nuclear-free states, while Kazakhstan term itself neither nuclear, nor nuclear-free."

"However, we did not pursue any other purposes but those of national security," Nazarbayev continued. "We displayed caution at the time when the USSR had collapsed and it was unknown what would become of Russia and our neighbours, at a time when the Moslem states were eager to exert influence. But now our stand has changed. This is explained by the fact that the United States has also changed its stand and now recognises Kazakhstan as a party to the Strategic Offensive Weapons Treaty. The parliament of Kazakhstan will ratify this document and thereby confirm to the United States its commitments to honour it. Kazakhstan will also take part in talks on the further reduction of nuclear weapons."

Nazarbayev also stressed the great importance of the Council for Collective Security, set up by the latest CIS summit in Tashkent, and of the initialled treaty on collective security. "The document says that the armies, formed by states-members of the council, will never be used against each other. We shall form a single defence space and in the event of any threat of aggression or direct aggression against any of those nations, it will be regarded as an attack on all those states and each of them will use all the means at its disposal to defend the victim of aggression," Nazarbayev stressed. "This alters radically the situation pertaining to the security of our state," he noted.

FRANCE

Cutbacks in Conventional Forces Outlined

92ES0794B Paris LE MONDE in French
30 Apr 92 p 9

[Text] France will have to get rid of 37 tanks, 68 artillery pieces, and 357 armored combat vehicles (VBC), according to the terms of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) when it has been ratified by all signatories.

This was the substance of Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe's reply to a written question from Bruno Bourg-Broc, RPR [Rally for the Republic] deputy from Marne, who had asked him about the schedule for application of the treaty signed in Paris in November 1990 by 22 East and West European nations. In France, the law was promulgated on 31 December 1991. However, not all signatory countries have yet ratified the treaty, beginning with those belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the former USSR.

In his response to the deputy, Joxe states that the French armed forces' schedule has three phases. First of all, within 16 months after the treaty goes into effect, France must get rid of at least 10 tanks, 17 artillery pieces, and 90 VBC's, which are armored personnel carriers or infantry combat vehicles (mainly old tanks of the AMX-13 type). Next, within 28 months, another 13 tanks, 24 artillery pieces, and 125 VBC's will be eliminated. Finally, within a maximum period of 40 months, 14 tanks, 27 artillery pieces, and 142 VBC's must have been done away with by France. As the treaty was being negotiated, France declared that its armed forces had 1,343 tanks, 1,360 artillery pieces, and 4,177 VBC's. In his reply to Bourg-Broc, Joxe states that cutbacks may involve the outright destruction of equipment. "The fact remains that France has complete latitude, if it deems it necessary, to accelerate the process," the minister explained, "particularly insofar as combat tanks and artillery pieces are concerned."

GERMANY

Defense Minister Ruehe Views Security Policy

92GE0360A Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 8 May 92 p 9

[Interview with Defense Minister Volker Ruehe by Udo Bergdoll and Stefan-Andreas Casdorf; place and date not given: "Instincts Can't Be Dismissed by Orders: Volker Ruehe States UN Role for the Army Cannot Be Realized"]

[Text] [SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Minister, where is the Bundeswehr's enemy?

[Ruehe] An army does not need any enemies, least of all, the Bundeswehr. It does not go around looking for images of bogeymen. Its primary job is the defense of the

country, and in this context, the defense and security of the stability and freedom of the entire country. You can see how many in Europe are lining up for NATO membership. Anyone who turns on a television can see how people are treated when they are not protected by an alliance and an adequate degree of military preparedness. For this reason, there is a growing understanding of just how important the armed forces are, and how important NATO is, so that we can live quietly and in peace.

[SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] What is the standard by which you judge whether an army is large enough, if it is not an enemy?

[Ruehe] Certainly not the enemy. Take a look at the armed forces of other countries. In the first instance, they are a reflection of the size of the country and the size of its population, then a reflection of the geostrategic situation. In any case, Germany, as the only country thus far in Europe to do so, has set an upper limit insofar as personnel is concerned. That was a political decision that was taken by the Federal Government in connection with reunification, but it was also a first step toward total European disarmament. One really cannot say that the Bundeswehr, given the situation Germany finds itself in today, and given the necessity of our contribution to the alliance, is oversized.

[SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] So who is threatening the security of the Federal Republic?

[Ruehe] Fortunately, no one, because we live in a strong alliance. But things would look quite different if that were not the case. Stability in Europe is not going to be handed to anyone on a silver platter, not even in the future.

[SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] So, do we really need 370,000 men for that?

[Ruehe] Yes. That is the decision that was reached.

[SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Between Gorbachev and Kohl.

[Ruehe] Yes, and it also corresponds to the figure we agreed to within NATO.

[SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] But the question really is whether we need that many soldiers.

[Ruehe] We made the first move. Now others must follow. The cutbacks in the next years will be a mighty undertaking for the Bundeswehr. For that reason, I do not hold with the notion of citing new figures all the time. I am happy that broad segments of the opposition hold this view as well. I am ready to go to bat for that view.

[SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Do we still need a national army? Are the forces within the European security system not enough?

[Ruehe] We have national forces that are completely integrated and interlocked within NATO. They are the armed forces of a security system. In former times, the main threat lay within the center of Europe, and our partners were ready to help here, where Germany is. Now, we, too, must be ready to secure the borders and the stability in the entire alliance.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Where does the main threat lie today?

[Ruehe] There is no longer a single major threat, and, for this reason, in addition to the main defense forces, which will entail as much as a good 50 percent, there must be crisis response forces at our side, in division strength, more or less. This force must be mobile within NATO. A divided Europe, with a divided Germany, in which one knew one's adversary, and every shrub on his turf, no longer exists.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Where do you place the risk today?

[Ruehe] There are many crisis hot spots today. As I said, the notion of mobility within the alliance is the new element that is being created in the 1990's.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Are "out of area" deployments precluded?

[Ruehe] "Out of area" is not the issue. But it is clear that expectations are being placed upon us—especially within the context of the United Nations. We have taken the first step by deploying a contingent that provided nothing more than medical assistance in the context of humanitarian aid to Cambodia. This contingent will provide medical assistance to the approximately 22,000 UN soldiers. At the present time, the United Nations has 40,000 peace-keeping troops deployed worldwide. It is quite clear to me that we must prepare ourselves for normal deployment under the aegis of the United Nations. Otherwise, we would create the impression that all we do is pay, and the others send the soldiers. This is a point that must be discussed and I see a chance for a consensus.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Chancellor Kohl said in New York that Germany wanted to play a larger role in the United Nations. Does that mean becoming involved in a war, as in the [Persian] Gulf?

[Ruehe] No. At the present time, I do not see any majority for an amendment to the Basic Law in that sense. Nor do I see that Germany is psychologically prepared for anything of the kind, insofar as the populace is concerned, or materially prepared, insofar as the Army is concerned. In point of fact, I agree with Henry Kissinger when he says that no one should expect any such combat deployments by the Germans within the next 10 years. I just do not know whether that is the proper time frame. There is a good deal of understanding, even in the United States, when I say there that the instincts the Germans have developed over the last

40 years, at least insofar as our reservation is concerned, cannot be dismissed by orders from the top. What is expected of us, of a certainty, is preparedness to assume normal peacekeeping military deployment under the UN flag. Incidentally, that position is supported by two-thirds of our population. For this reason, sending our medical contingent, on a short-term basis, was long overdue. Next Monday, in Munich, I shall say farewell to the soldiers, and I shall soon hold additional talks with the opposition, where there is also a majority in favor of UN deployment.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] In your ruminations, what role does the Western European Union [WEU] play?

[Ruehe] That is of increasing importance. There is the feeling in the United States that its forces were overextended in the past and that the Europeans and the Japanese did too little. When I look at the events in Los Angeles and elsewhere, this tendency will increase. It is important for us that the Americans remain in Europe, because they are a component of what I would like to call the European security culture. But already it is becoming evident that there could be situations in which NATO is either not able or not willing to become involved in Europe. For this reason, it is important to build up a European defense identity.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Does that extend to having its own military committee, like NATO?

[Ruehe] No. In the WEU, in conjunction with the relocation of its headquarters to Brussels, we are setting up a planning office which will have to think about situations like the one I just described. Insofar as the military side is concerned, we have come a long way in defining the tasks of the Euro-Corps. What began as a Franco-German initiative now has a good chance of developing into a true Euro-Corps. We are working in quite concrete terms on strengthening the European defense identity, but not in competition with NATO.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Can the Bundeswehr, in a defense of Europe, do without entire components, significant portions of its armed forces?

[Ruehe] It is simply expected of a state of the magnitude of Germany, and it is no more than appropriate, that it have an army, an air force, and a navy, but their dimensions are not gigantic. The Navy, for example, will soon have a force of no more than 26,000 men; the number of its ships will be cut in half. Nor will the Luftwaffe be excessively large, by any stretch of the imagination. Having to do without portions of its armed forces becomes an issue only for a country that is markedly smaller than Germany. Otherwise, we could not fulfill our obligations within the alliance.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] When will you stop the European fighter aircraft?

[Ruehe] Right after the meeting of the coalition committee on 1 June, I will go to the caucuses...

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] ...to both caucuses, the Union and the FDP [Free Democratic Party] caucuses?

[Ruehe] Yes, if I am invited, I'll also go to the FDP caucus. It goes without saying that I will not include one penny in the 1993 budget for the production of a fighter plane before the caucuses have reached a decision in principle on the matter here.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] And you are leaning toward a no on the fighter?

[Ruehe] I won't tell you that here and now. Beginning in the year 2000, we shall need a replacement for the Phantom, but I am skeptical, given the changed position in terms of security policy, as to whether a superbird is needed. Besides, given pricing developments, the question is raised whether one would obtain a sufficient number of aircraft.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] That sounds like a plea for another, simpler...

[Ruehe] No. I am not pleading, merely outlining the situation. And that is that the world looks completely different from the way it did in 1985, and there is no longer an arms race. There will be no additional, more modern aircraft in the CIS states. The same holds true of other areas. Whoever does not come to terms with it himself now, will be forced by others to do so later. In a democracy, it is possible, in the long run, to implement only that which one can readily justify. I prefer asking all the questions myself, because then my position is stronger.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] How do you mean that?

[Ruehe] Well, my first principle is to use the limited funds for the Bundeswehr of the future, not for plans based on the situation in the past. Without referring to the fighter, I would say that in the future there will be a lot of research and development, but not everything will be built. If the international situation then actually does heat up, it will be possible to resort to these developments. That would be a new philosophy that would create leeway in planning for the Bundeswehr.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] The leeway will grow smaller because the defense budget will shrink. Can you define the minimum for your budget?

[Ruehe] I do not think any other department would have made any greater contributions to thrift, but here, too, I try to apply a philosophy that is different from what was usual in former times. I do not say: I want to keep what I have, and, when the cuts come, I consider them a defeat.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] The minimum...

[Ruehe] ...I won't tell you. You are not the minister of finance. There are limits, of course, but, above all, I want to show that the Army itself is thrifty, that it long ago began the process of overcoming division by sharing. I do not want to suffer the process of thriftiness; rather, I want to help shape it, so that it progresses in a reasonable way. If there is any leeway, I want to use it for people, to improve the social conditions of the soldiers, for example, with an increase of military pay, albeit a modest one.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] The CSU [Christian Social Union] has called for a foreign policy. Do we also need a new security policy?

[Ruehe] That is a process. It cannot be accomplished overnight. A great deal has changed, and there have been conceptual weaknesses as well...

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Which ones would those be?

[Ruehe] I have tried to come to terms with them from time to time, but...

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Which conceptual weaknesses?

[Ruehe] No, the weakness of adjusting to the new world order, the new responsibility, now that we have emerged from this clearly delineated world of East and West. But particularly in the area of security policy, we have enormous new beginnings, with the NATO Cooperation Council, for example. There are still questions without pat answers in some areas, such as the limits and the shape of cooperation between NATO, CSCE, and the WEU, for example. Everything has to be rearranged in that sector.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] From stem to stern?

[Ruehe] There are a few constants, such as NATO, for example; but with the strengthening of the European defense identity, the strengthening of the WEU, the new development of the CSCE, all these things have to be newly interfaced with one another. That is a challenge; I am looking forward to it.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Will the CSCE, with its many members, unravel?

[Ruehe] Most important of all is NATO. It must not be overextended with too many security agreements and guarantees, which would cause it to lose its credibility. In terms of its role, the CSCE is not comparable; it is a process that has not yet reached a conclusion.

SPD Presents Foreign Policy Concepts

AU1505134792 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 15 May 92 p 4

["B.A.N." report: "SPD [Social Democratic Party] Presents Foreign Policy Concept"]

[Text] Bonn, 14 May—Johannes Rau, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], and Presidium member Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, the chairpersons of the SPD "International Policies" project group, on Thursday [14 May] presented theses on the reorientation of German foreign policy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the "practical and ideological division into two parts of the world," the West European democracies are facing new challenges. "They must ensure the stability of their own countries and their supranational communities, while at the same time providing active help for the establishment and stabilization of the community of states that is developing." The SPD politicians mentioned two—previously cited—principles that should determine Germany's foreign policy: realism and responsibility: "realism in assessing the possibilities of codetermining events in view of the enormous problems that our eastern neighbor countries are facing, and responsibility in setting priorities in view of our country's significance for the great challenges of our time." In this connection, Rau and Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul mentioned arms reduction and the acceleration of ecological restructuring. The willingness for peace based on pluralism and tolerance must be strengthened, and just living conditions must be created in other parts of the world. "These are the most effective instruments for curbing migration movements."

The SPD calls for a basic change in NATO's military strategy, which it describes in the following way in the document: "German policy should contribute to ensuring that NATO renounces a nuclear first strike, that all land, sea, and airborne tactical nuclear weapons are scrapped, and that no nuclear weapons remain stationed on German territory. Germany should advocate coordination among nuclear powers within NATO and the Commonwealth of Independent States to ensure that warheads and carrier systems are stored separately so that the danger posed by nuclear weapons can be reduced considerably." The disarmament process within the

CSCE should be intensified, and cooperative security structures should be developed.

European policies must be "explained to the public and based on parliamentary principles." This applies to the decisions of the EC Council of Ministers. Only in this way can the prevailing skepticism toward European unification be dispelled. The EC summit scheduled to take place in Lisbon in June should reflect the Community's willingness to "expand to the north." Later the EC can accept East European states. "Those who promise EC membership to Bulgaria, Romania, or Albania at this point endanger European unification and ultimately harm the development of these countries." With a view to Third World states ("policy toward the South"), the two SPD politicians called for the trade barriers of the EC to be reduced. This is more important and more effective than the transfer of capital. Only the "ecological restructuring" of industrial societies can counter the "dramatic threat to the natural environment and the drastic impoverishment of large regions in the South."

In connection with the "responsibility of German foreign policy," the document calls for a "far-reaching demilitarization of the security concept." Military operations are the wrong reaction in most cases. "Nonmilitary security concepts must link economic, ecological, social, and cultural measures with foreign policy." An amendment to the Constitution should make possible the participation of the Bundeswehr in UN peacekeeping missions. "There will be no majority for an amendment to the Basic Law allowing for the participation of the Bundeswehr in military operations outside the NATO area." Rau and Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul called on the Federal Government not to permit false expectations in this respect among the European neighbors.

The SPD politicians described human and civil rights as a "central demand in international relations." Economic interests must not be given priority over an "insistence on the observance of human rights." Foreign trade policy must not run counter to limitations and the control of arms exports.

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